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2  Introduction 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Historically, budget policy is the parliamentary right par excellence and constitutes a key feature of 
parliamentary democracy. From the beginning of the 1970s, persistent budget deficits in almost all 
major OECD countries are observable and consequently resulted in a continuous increase in public 
debt levels. This rise in public debt became a global phenomenon of democratic capitalism and led 
to the era of the debt state (Streeck 2013). Political scientist studied the trend of rising debt levels 
extensively and provided several, occasionally contested, explanations for the increasing 
indebtedness, such as fiscal illusion, intergenerational redistribution and budgetary institutions (e.g. 
Alesina and Perotti 1995; Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999; Feld and Kirchgässner 2001). Far less 
attention has been paid to the question of how governments finance these deficits and to the 
accompanying consequences for the structure and administration of these debt volumes. 
Simultaneously to rising debt levels, states increasingly rely on financial markets in order to (re-
)finance their debts. This includes the adoption of financial market techniques, the growing reliance 
on marketable debt and the use of innovative financial instruments such as derivatives - a 
phenomenon referred to as the financialization of public debt (Fastenrath et al. 2017). Within this 
process, states, which have to regulate financial markets, became active participants on these 
international financial markets to (re-)finance public debt and current deficits at the lowest possible 
cost. This participation includes the attraction of investors by achieving and maintaining high credit 
ratings that, inter alia, include the evaluation of parliamentary and governmental fiscal decisions. 
By ceding this interpretational sovereignty of the common good, meaning the rating of public 
policy related expenditures in financial terms, to market actors a hegemony of marketable debt 
accrues (Lemoine 2016). 
Changes in the composition of public debt can be observed on the national as well as the 
subnational level. Thereby governments no longer perceive debt management as an “extension of 
monetary policy” to stabilize macroeconomics aspects of the economy (Currie et al. 2003: 11) but 
focus on portfolio optimization to reduce debt servicing cost. In this sense, the goals of PDM 
changed fundamentally from macroeconomic to fiscal objectives including a clear focus on cost 
minimization; a process, which intertwines with the financialization and accompanies the 
transformation from the debt state to the consolidation state (Streeck 2015). Following the logic of this 
sense-making framework derived from financial economics (Fastenrath et al. 2017: 274), even 
municipalities make strategic use of different debt instruments which are associated to high 
financial risk (e.g. Diemert 2013; Junkernheinrich and Wagschal 2014; Trampusch and Spies 2015; 
Pérez and Prieto 2015; Pérignon and Vallée 2017). 
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On the national level, the increased orientation to financial markets is furthermore accompanied 
by substantial institutional changes in the administration of public debt (e.g. Bröker 1993: 47-51). 
The new objective of active public debt management (PDM)1 by portfolio optimization is delegated 
to independent agencies detached from the government (e.g. Currie et al. 2003; Lemoine 2016). 
These debt management offices (DMOs) are equipped with a certain degree of autonomy, in order 
to fulfil their assigned tasks and operate as active players on international financial markets (OECD 
2002: 41; Currie et al. 2003: 17; Melecky 2012). The process of delegation to specialized agencies 
to enhance professionalization and efficiency entails the risk of decreasing accountability and 
political control (Thatcher and Sweet 2002: 17; Christensen and Laegreid 2007: 501). This becomes 
even more relevant as the intensified orientation towards liberalized financial markets affects 
countries’ fiscal vulnerability to adverse exogenous shocks (Currie et al. 2003: 42; Missale 2012: 
169), as shown by the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, as interest payments usually constitute large 
items within public budgets, DMOs’ strategic PDM decisions are closely linked to fiscal and 
budgetary policies (Currie et al. 2003: 9; Missale 2012: 158), which represent core elements of 
parliamentary control and are usually heavily protected. 
Taken together, the deregulation of financial markets, accompanied by the financialization of public 
debt and the delegation to specialized debt agencies has led to a depolitization of public debt 
(Lemoine 2016). Given that public budgets ultimately collateralize the associated risks involved in 
actively managing public debt and using innovative financial instruments, the relationship between 
politics and modern PDM is of major relevance for legitimacy in democratic capitalism. Therefore, 
the present dissertation investigates the overarching research question of the relationship between 
politics and PDM in several steps. 
As debt instrument selection is a crucial and strategic aspect of PDM to optimize debt portfolios, 
chapter 2 examines the question which economic and political factors have an impact on the use 
and extent of short-term debt instruments on the municipal level. Finding that the municipalities’ 
budgetary situation represents the key determining factor of their share of short-term debt, the 
results demonstrate the need for different approaches to grasp the phenomenon of PDM. The 
minor explanatory power of partisanship of the council majority and the mayor as well as the 
respective election results indicate that the underlying political factors might be more complex and 
that institutional settings also need to be taken into account which underlines the necessity for 
further concept formations on the political side of PDM. The results ultimately raise the question 
about the relationship between elected politicians and PDM and of whether or not politicians have 
influence on PDM at all. Consequently, chapter 3 investigates the institutional setting of DMOs 
                                                 
1 The terms public debt management (PDM) and sovereign debt management (SDM) are used synonymously in this 
dissertation. 
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on the national level by analyzing the relationship between DMOs and their respective parent 
ministry. The analysis focusses on the variation of autonomy across countries resulting out of this 
delegation process. The finding that DMOs have substantial autonomy in decision-making 
competencies, while especially DMOs separated from the core administration are subject of 
relatively low reporting obligations, naturally raises doubts concerning political control. Chapter 4 
consequently addresses the question whether PDM is subject of parliamentary control. The results 
show that parliaments have relatively low control of PDM, which indicates a trade-off between 
expertise and control. Moreover, this chapter underlines the necessity to differentiate between 
budget and debt policy and subsequently between debt level and debt structure. 
 
1.1 Research on Public Debt Management 
While there is substantial research on budget deficits and debt levels, political-economic research 
on PDM and the structure of public debt is rather scarce. The following chapter therefore starts 
with an overview of the institutional reforms and changes taken place within the last decades, 
including a summary of existing research on DMOs. Subsequently, this chapter reviews the 
literature related to the adoption of financial market techniques by states as a crucial aspect of 
PDM. 
PDM has changed significantly within the last decades in a number of OECD countries (Currie et. 
al. 2003: 27). The PDM functions started as simple operational activities historically spread across 
different institutions, mostly central banks, ministries of finance (MoF), or central depositories 
(Borresen and Cosio-Pascal 2002: 18; IMF and WB 2003). These began to be reformed and bundled 
in specialized organizations called DMOs during the 1990s and the early 2000s (Bröker 1993; 
Cassard and Folkerts-Landau 2000; Currie et al. 2003). The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund define Public Debt Management as “the process of establishing and executing a strategy for 
managing the government’s debt in order to raise the required amount of funding at the lowest possible cost over the 
medium to long run, consistent with a prudent degree of refinancing and rollover risk” (IMF 2014: 5; IMF and 
WB 2003). These general objectives of PDM can differ across countries with respect to their 
particular focus. Furthermore, depending on the level of economic development and integration, 
the objective of capital market development with regard to the domestic currency can additionally 
play an important role. In order to meet cost-saving considerations, facing high-risk profiles of 
countries’ debt portfolios, and increasing the credibility of monetary policy, a re-definition of the 
PDM mandate and objectives has taken place in many OECD countries (Currie et al. 2003: 15; 
Wheeler 2004; Blommestein and Turner 2012). This has become a modern worldwide 
phenomenon (Golebiowski and Marchewka-Bartkowiak 2011: 4) and has been deemed necessary 
in order to assure the credibility of monetary policies and to cope with the increasing technical 
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challenges of financial markets (Missale 2012). At the same time, the international financial market 
liberalization supported this development (Missale 2012: 159) by giving governments an easier 
access to financial capital markets (Trampusch 2015: 3). The tasks of DMOs are to ensure countries 
borrowing needs, minimize borrowing costs, and assure an adequate risk portfolio (Blommestein 
and Turner 2012: 7; IMF 2014: 5; IMF and WB 2003) including the usage of complex and 
innovative financial instruments like derivatives (Piga 2001). Analogously to the change in the role, 
objective, and mandate of DMOs, their institutional setting within the national public sphere has 
changed as well (Borresen and Cosio-Pascal 2002: 17). This shift in the delegation of PDM had 
major implications on the institutional organization of debt management systems that consist of 
DMOs, MoF and central banks (e.g. Bröker 1993; Currie et al. 2003; Sieg 2013) and led to the 
centralization into newly created highly specialized public organizations (Cassard and Folkerts-
Landau 2000). 
Within this reorganization “debt management professionalization and autonomy from political decision-making 
became the norm and the standard promoted by international organisations” (Lemoine 2017: 259). This 
promotion is assisted by the leading economists of OECD, IMF and WB, which have a specific 
understanding of the implementation of public debt and function as a guideline and best-practice 
setter. Consequently, whether or not the created organization is located within the given 
departmental structures or as a separate legal entity, OECD guidelines recommend that DMOs 
“should have sufficient autonomy from the political sphere” (OECD 2002: 41). The reasons behind granting 
DMOs autonomy is the same rationale that is applied to central banks and regulatory agencies. 
Correspondingly, it can be understood that separating PDM from political processes is a crucial 
aspect in order to avoid perceived risks of opportunistic behavior by politicians. These might face 
incentives to exert political pressure to reduce short term debt servicing costs, which might imply 
higher risks (Currie et al. 2003: 17; Cassard and Folkerts-Landau 1997) or to avoid focusing on 
current deficits in order to accomplish short time goals that could bias the decisions of debt 
managers (Missale 2012: 173). Hereby, accountability and transparency in PDM, so the 
assumptions, can be achieved (OECD 2002: 41). 
The delegated PDM objectives are operationalized in a strategy (IMF 2014: 24), which should 
incorporate the government’s tolerance for risk (IMF 2014: 33). Debt managers have to filter key 
information used by investors and market participants and shape investors’ demand and 
expectations through reliable debt management practices. They ensure effective market 
communication between the debt issuing office, the central bank and financial markets, which on 
its own is an important element to attract investors’ interest (e.g. through issuance plans) 
(Blommestein et al. 2010). As the central connector between the government and the financial 
market, they have to maintain good contacts with domestic and foreign investors, “to meet their 
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ongoing financing needs” (ibid: 18). The aspect of autonomy is thereby perceived as the means to cope 
with the challenges emerging from increasingly complex financial markets. It is intended to provide 
DMOs with, first, more flexibility and, second, higher professionalism (Piga 2001: 17). It is widely 
argued and recommended that DMOs, as a central market player on sovereign debt markets, need 
a certain degree of operational autonomy to achieve their given tasks, implement PDM strategies, 
and execute PDM policies (e.g. OECD 2002: 41; Golebiowski und Marchewka-Bartkowiak 2011: 
2; Melecky 2012). Furthermore, receiving discretion over human resources management enables 
DMOs to recruit specialized and professional staff (OECD 2002: 41). Flexibility and 
professionalism is also considered as a prerequisite for efficiency, since in contrast to the former 
conduct of PDM, emphasis started to be placed on actively managed public debt (Currie et al. 2003: 
17). Risk management is a central element of it and also demands autonomy in order to improve 
PDM (OECD 2002: 41). 
Existing research on analyzing DMOs’ institutional arrangement focusses on their organizational 
location and formal-legal status. Other aspects of autonomy regarding the actual structural relation 
to the parent ministry or parliament has only been addressed rudimentarily, if at all. Currie et al. 
(2003) establish a concept with two different organizational types of DMOs. Either a DMO is 
located within the MoF, in the following ministerial DMO (MDMO), or established as a legally 
separated entity outside of the ministry (SDMOs). While they state that the newly established 
DMOs are equipped with certain degrees of operational autonomy regardless of their 
organizational location, this aspect is not further investigated (Currie et al. 2003: 8). Thus, it is 
neither conceptualized nor differentiated between different DMOs. However, incorporating 
principal-agent issues, SDMOs require clearer strategy settings, which implies greater need for 
control mechanisms. The DMO concept of Golebiowski and Marchewka-Bartkowiak (2011: 3) 
contains two different criteria: (1) it distinguishes between a ministerial, a banking, and an agency 
model depending on DMOs location; (2) the organizational status is defined by the DMOs’ legal 
status, differentiating between legal act (outside MoF), internal document (inside MoF) and 
separate department (inside MoF). The importance of autonomy is mentioned with regard to 
DMOs’ participation in financial markets on an equal rights basis towards other actors and with 
respect to PDM strategies as well as goal achievement but has not been operationalized 
(Golebiowski and Marchewka-Bartkowiak 2011: 2). Besides DMOs’ location and legal status, the 
study describes internal and external audit aspects. Sieg (2013) also distinguishes between DMOs 
as part of the MoF, as a separate unit outside the MoF, and as part of the central bank. Additionally, 
this study includes the allocation of competencies between MoF, DMO and central bank within 
the PDM system, which differs across countries. 
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The review of existing concepts categorizing DMOs reveals substantial gaps in the understanding 
of their institutional setting and especially in their relationship with their parent ministries as well 
as the aspect of parliamentary control. A dichotomous understanding of organizational structure 
by differentiating between DMOs within and outside of ministerial structures is insufficient to shed 
light on the relationships of these organizations towards the MoF and the parliament. 
The literature on agencification and delegation points out that when analyzing the process and the 
consequences of delegation towards public organizations, the transferred task and mandate is of 
importance to the underlying rationale (e.g. Thatcher and Sweet 2002; Verhoest et al. 2004; 
Maggetti 2007; Moe 2013). In the case of PDM, the delegated task of portfolio optimization in 
order to reduce debt servicing cost is directly connected to the process of financialization of the 
state, which means the “the restructuring of state institutions and power in line with the growing influence of 
finance in today’s world” (Lagna 2016: 168). For the financialization of PDM, this implies on the one 
hand the adoption of financial market techniques and on the other hand, as shown above, the 
creation of the respective capacities by institutional change to conduct these techniques (e.g. 
Lemoine 2016, Lagna 2016). The adoption manifests itself through governments in two ways 
(Fastenrath et al. 2017: 274). First, they increasingly rely on financial markets in the governance of 
their debt by using market-based modes of refinancing and related financial market transactions, 
such as the issuance of marketable debt and the use of auctions. Second, in this context they 
implement ideas and models of financial economics as the sense-making framework for debt 
management decisions. While non-financialized PDM was grounded in classic macroeconomics of 
stabilizing the economy and debt management was viewed as an “extension of monetary policy” 
(Currie et al. 2003: 11), today, the sense-making framework of debt management is grounded in 
the models of financial economics (Fastenrath et al. 2017). Debt is viewed as liability portfolio, 
which governments seek to optimize through maturity management or the diversification of 
currency risks achieved by drawing on complex financial innovations like derivatives and an 
increasing use of marketable debt instruments. While typical non-marketable debt instruments such 
as foreign-currency loans, loans from financial institutions and savings bonds for personal investors 
are not tradable at secondary markets, marketable debt instruments that can be traded include 
short-term securities (mainly Treasury bills), medium-term securities or notes and long-term 
securities or bonds, including index-linked bonds i.e. bonds whose payments are related to a price 
index (Fastenrath et al. 2017: Fn. 5). This optimization is based on the calculation of cost-risk trade-
offs through mathematical modelling, applying standard portfolio theory (ibid: 278-280). 
The rationale of optimization is not exclusively applied to central government debt. Also on the 
subnational level, increasing debt levels cause increases in interest payments, which enhance 
existing fiscal distress. Therefore, also municipalities draw on active debt management in order to 
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widen their fiscal scope of action (e.g. Trampusch and Spies 2015; Fastenrath et al. 2017b). 
Analogously to the national level, active PDM can be subject to substantial financial risk. Research 
on the use of short-term debt instruments in German municipalities shows that these instruments 
are regularly misused by highly indebted municipalities as a permanent financing instrument 
(Herrmann 2011; Junkernheinrich and Wagschal 2014; Rösel 2017). In this way, short-term debt is 
connected to liquidity as well as roll-over risks since refinancing has to happen more often and is 
subject to interest rate risk (Diemert 2013: 86; Holler 2013: 52). Analyzing the use of swaps in 
North Rhine-Westphalian municipalities, Trampusch and Spies (2015) find that the use of these 
derivatives is mainly driven by economic factors. Similar developments in terms of instrument 
selection are observable in Spain (Pérez and Prieto 2015) as well as in France. Pérignon and Vallée 
(2017) show that highly indebted French municipalities are willing to issue highly risky structured 
loans in politically contested areas and in times of elections, thereby exposing the public budget to 
the risk of increasing interest payments in the future. Benton and Smith (2014) find that cost-
efficiency characteristics in the instrument selection is connected to ideological partisan effects. 
These findings show that also subnational politicians face a trade-off between cost minimization 
in terms of interest payments and financial risks. Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on the 
extent to which political factors drive the willingness to take financial risks. 
 
1.2 Overview of included studies 
Chapter 2, titled Municipal Debt Management: Explaining Variation in Municipal Debt Portfolios, 
investigates differences in the usage and extent of short-term debt instruments in German 
municipalities. Previous research on subnational debt has mainly focused on the debt level, but 
neglected the accompanying consequences for the structure of debt portfolios. While some studies 
investigated possible explanatory factors for the use of specific single debt instruments, this study 
analyses previously unused data to assess municipalities’ overall debt portfolio by its maturity 
structure. As short-term debt is associated with lower interest rates, it is suitable to optimize debt 
portfolios by lower interest payments and consequently increase a municipality’s fiscal scope of 
action. Nevertheless, short-term debt is also connected to several financial risks such as roll-over 
and liquidity risks, which might endanger local public budgets. By taking into account economic as 
well as political variables, this study addresses the question which factors explain the usage of and 
extent of short-term debt instruments across municipalities. 
The derived hypotheses are tested using a dataset covering 392 North Rhine Westphalian 
municipalities for the years 2010, 2012 and 2014. The panel covers the complete debt portfolio of 
the respective municipalities and contains political data on the local councils and mayors from the 
election results of 2009. The study develops an economic, a political and a combined model, each 
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of which are estimated as a probit model to analyze the general usage of short-term debt and 
subsequently as a tobit model to investigate the variation in the magnitude of short-term debt use 
across municipalities. 
The analysis shows that the share of short-term debt on a municipality’s portfolio can mainly be 
explained by economic factors, while political factors are of less explanatory power. The usage as 
well as the extent of short-term debt are heavily driven by a municipality’s indebtedness and its 
reliance on non-public creditors. Moreover, the results confirm that a higher share of short-term 
debt reduces interest payments. This indicates that municipalities are able to reduce the fiscal 
burden of interest payments through short-term debt instruments. Nevertheless, the use and extent 
of these instruments also leads to a decrease in investment expenditures. This confirms the 
assumption that short-term debt discourages long-term investments. 
 
Chapter 3, titled Walking the Tightrope? The Autonomy of Public Debt Management Offices investigates the 
relationship of DMOs towards the ministry of finance as a matter of autonomy. Based on the 
process of delegating PDM to newly created and highly specialized DMOs, this study constructs a 
multi-dimensional index to measure the degree as well as differences in the composition of 
autonomy across several OECD countries. While previous studies on DMOs only roughly 
distinguished between MDMOs and SDMOs the presented approach analyzes the organizational 
setting of DMOs beyond their formal legal status, which is often perceived as insufficient to assess 
the autonomy of public organizations. Besides the analysis of differences in the configuration of 
autonomy, a multi-dimensional concept of autonomy also provides insights into similarities across 
different types of organizations. 
Based on the literature on agencification and delegation theory, this study elaborates a multi-
dimensional concept of DMO autonomy divided into the broader categories decision-making 
competencies and constraints on decision-making competencies. Subsequently, these categories are further 
specified into the dimensions managerial, policy, financial, interventional and structural autonomy. The 
indicator level consists of 30 items mainly derived from research on independent regulatory 
agencies, central bank independence and guidelines on PDM. The index is applied to an originally 
compiled data set of 12 OECD countries covering DMOs that are embedded into different 
institutional settings. 
The results show that SDMOs are on average more autonomous than MDMOs. However, the 
continuous distribution in the degree of autonomy indicates that the underlying organizational 
differences and similarities are more complex than assumed by the dichotomous perception of 
previous studies on DMOs. The detailed analysis reveals that SDMOs’ higher autonomy is rooted 
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primarily in lesser constraints on decision-making rather than in decision-making competencies 
itself. Both types of DMOs are surprisingly homogeneous with respect to policy autonomy, which 
can be seen as the crucial aspect in the interaction with financial markets. Considering that MDMOs 
as well as MDMOs have to carry out similar tasks and execute their operations on the same financial 
markets, this might indicate that policy autonomy is more task than status related. In sum, this 
study finds that even though PDM is subject of considerable financial risks, the average autonomy 
of decision-making is relatively high, while particularly SDMOs have to fulfil only limited reporting 
and auditing obligations. 
 
Chapter 4, titled Variation of Parliamentary Control over Central Governments’ Sovereign Debt Management 
suggests an initial index for measuring the variation in parliamentary control over SDM. Against 
the background of countries’ increasing reliance on financial markets, in order to refinance their 
debt burden and the accompanying financialization of SDM by adapting financial market 
techniques, this study analyzes variation in parliamentary control over SDM carried out by DMOs 
as a matter of accountability and transparency. Previous research studied variation in parliamentary 
control over budget policies extensively as budgetary authority is the parliamentary right par 
excellence, but neglected the question of control over the consequences resulting out of budget policy 
in deficit and the accumulation of debt. 
Based on the literature on non-majoritarian institutions, delegation and agencification, this study 
elaborates a concept to measure parliamentary control and operationalize transparency and 
accountability within the dimensions legal framework, organizational structure, implementation, and 
reporting. Subsequently, it derives items from research on independent regulatory agencies, central 
bank independence, budgetary rules and publications on SDM. This index is applied to an originally 
compiled data set of 17 OECD countries, containing different types of developed capitalist 
economies for cross-national comparison. 
The results show that parliamentary control over SDM is overall relatively low and with only minor 
cross-country variation. Nevertheless, taking into account different subsets of countries, the 
analysis reveals different ways of parliamentary control and substantial trade-offs between the 
analyzed dimensions of control. Moreover, this study sheds light on the relationship between 
parliamentary control of SDM and types of democracy, budget authority and transparency, the 
organizational structure of SDM as well as former central bank independence and financialization. 
In sum, these results indicate that parliaments seem to have only limited control over SDM policy 
and that it is inevitable to differentiate both between budget and debt policies and between the 
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level and the type of debt. Consequently, the study confirms the findings of delegation literature 
on the trade-off between expertise and control. 
 
1.3 Status of studies 
 
Municipal Debt Management: Explaining Variation in Municipal Debt Portfolios (Chapter 2) is single-
authored and submitted to Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. 
 
Walking the Tightrope? The Autonomy of Public Debt Management Offices (Chapter 3) is joint work with 
Nawid Hoshmand and has received a revised and resubmit by Regulation & Governance. The included 
version is revised. Both authors contributed equally to this study. 
 
Variation of Parliamentary Control over Central Governments’ Sovereign Debt Management (Chapter 4) is joint 
work with Christine Trampusch and currently under review at Public Administration. Both authors 
contributed equally to this study. 
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2 Municipal Debt Management: Explaining Variation in 
Municipal Debt Portfolios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The increasing indebtedness of subnational governments is a widely recognized phenomenon but 
so far research has mainly focused on the debt level while neglecting the consequences in the local 
debt structures. Municipalities increasingly face rising debt burdens and tackle the accompanying 
interest payments through changes in the instrument selection in order to optimize their debt 
portfolios. This active management of public debt is thereby subject to several financial risks which 
ultimately are secured by local public budgets. This study uses data on the municipal debt structure 
to investigate the economic and political factors which explain the usage and extent of short-term 
debt by North Rhine-Westphalian municipalities. We find that the share of short-term debt is 
largely driven by municipalities’ indebtedness and their dependence on non-public creditors. 
Moreover, while municipalities are able to reduce their interest payments, the usage of short-term 
debt leads to a decreased share of investment expenditures. These findings confirm that short-term 
debt is frequently misused as a permanent financing tool which contains considerable amount of 
risk and discourages long-term investments. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Not least since the financial crisis and its accompanying debt crisis public debt has received 
enormous attention. Besides the development of public finance on the national level, the story of 
public debt literally goes much deeper. Especially in federalized countries where several sovereign 
tasks are carried out on the municipal level, the increase in public debt is widely perceived as 
problematic (e.g. Bogumil et al. 2014; Junkernheinbrich/Wagschal 2014; Boysen-Hogrefe 2014; 
Pérignon/Vallée 2017). But while on the national level we observe an increase of public debt in 
nearly all high income OECD countries, the situation on the municipal level is different. The fiscal 
situation of German municipalities is very heterogeneous in terms of their respective deficits and 
thus the debt level. Given the fiscal framework, a municipality’s influence on its revenues is very 
limited as the expenditures to fulfil their obligations are not directly connected to changes in the 
revenues (Boettcher 2012). Therefore many municipalities which face structural changes and 
economic problems tend to react to these with an increase in public debt. Highly indebted 
municipalities face several problems which are directly connected to their debt level. On the one 
hand, a higher debt level is associated with higher interest payments which limits their fiscal scope 
of action and consequently results in even more debt to fulfil their tasks. On the other hand, this 
limitation increases the pressure to reduce interest payments by optimizing the respective debt 
structure. While there is a considerable amount of research on the determinants of subnational 
debt levels, there are only a few studies aiming at an explanation for the use of specific debt 
instruments to refinance municipal debt (e.g. Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 2014; Rösel 2017; 
Pérignon/Vallée 2017). This is surprising as, analogously to the national level, subnational debt 
contains a considerable amount of risk (e.g. Pérez/Prieto 2015: 787). This takes especially effect 
for short-term debt as it is more vulnerable to liquidity crises (Guscina 2008: 5). 
So far only descriptively used data on German municipal debt allows us to asses and analyze 
municipalities’ complete debt portfolio by its maturity. Consequently, the aim of this study is to 
identify the determinants of the decision of using short term debt in general and which factors 
explain the differences in the extent of its usage. 
Subnational governments and local authorities increasingly face their rising debt burdens by 
changes in the instrument selection in order to optimize their debt portfolios. Financial instruments 
are connected to financial risks which differ depending on the type of instrument. The use of 
marketable and/or instruments with variable interest rates is linked to the dependency on financial 
market developments which decreases the long-term predictability of cash-flows. Moreover, the 
use of foreign currency loans or credits exposes municipalities to currency fluctuations. For 
example, the devaluation of the Swiss franc caused substantial fiscal distress in a number of German 
municipalities as they used innovative financial instruments including derivatives (currency swaps) 
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to lower their interest rates due to higher risk premium on long-term instruments (e.g. Guscina 
2008). At least theoretically, the increasing use of short-term debt instruments leads to a decrease 
in interest payments due to lower interest rates but at the same time an increase of liquidity and 
roll-over risks as future refinancing has to happen at unexpected cost (Diemert 2013: 86; Holler 
2013: 52). This predisposes the debtor to a growing dependency on shifting the existing debt to 
the given conditions in order to repay the expiring credit or loan. Therefore municipalities are 
confronted with a trade-off between cost minimization and risk optimization (Birkholz 2006; 
Mosley 2015: 157). The use of short term liquidity debt instruments has increased massively within 
the last decades. Starting at nearly zero in 1990s (Rösel 2017), in 2015 NRW municipalities hold on 
average about 1475€ per capita in Kassenkredite - short term liquidity credits, the most common kind 
of short-term debt for German municipalities - which accounts for 53% of the total average debt 
per capita. Even though it was meant to be an instrument to overcome short term liquidity 
shortages it has become a permanent refinancing tool (Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 2014: 306). 
Given the variance in the composition of municipal debt portfolios, the question arises which 
factors explain why municipalities handle this trade-off differently. NRW is a prominent example 
as its municipalities hold a significant amount of Kassenkredite and furthermore multiple 
municipalities have received special transfer payments due to their fiscal distress which accounts 
for the tense situation. Moreover, NRW represents a competitive-democratic structure within the 
German federal system which is characterized by an institutional setting that favors the power and 
competencies of parties versus the mayor or single council members (Bogumil/Holtkamp 2013: 
37ff.). 
Previous studies on the structure of German municipalities’ debt has mainly focused on the use of 
single instruments. In their study on Kassenkredite, Junkernheinrich and Wagschal (2014) find that 
socio-economic as well as political factors such as the size and polarization of the municipal council 
have a significant impact on the use of this specific type of instrument. Additionally, the mayor’s 
election outcome seems to constitute a relevant factor. Studying the use of high risk structured 
loans in French municipalities Pérignon and Vallée (2015) also identify the fiscal and economic 
situation as a significant factor to determine a municipality’s affinity to use financial instruments 
associated with high risks. Trampusch and Spies (2015) analyze the usage of derivatives for 
municipalities in NRW and identify the debt level as the main driver for using SWAPS. Rösel (2017) 
analyzes the impact of supervision on short-term deficits and finds that partisanship of fiscal 
supervisors and local governments influences decisions on the use of Kassenkredite. He shows that 
left-wing supervisors tolerate more short-term debt than right-wing supervisors which also holds 
for the partisanship of local government authorities. These studies focus mainly on the use of 
Municipal Debt Management   21 
financial instruments which are connected to specific financial risks. Thereby they miss the 
structure of the municipalities’ debt portfolio as a whole. 
The results show that the decision on the usage as well as the extent of short-term debt instruments 
is mainly driven by economic factors while political variables are of minor explanatory power. By 
using short-term debt, municipalities manage to reduce the budgetary burden caused by interest 
payment which is accompanied by a lower share of investment expenditures. This holds especially 
for municipalities which have to deal with a high level of public debt. Moreover, cities are in general 
more likely to use short-term debt. 
This study is structured as follows. Introduced by a brief overview on the fiscal situation of German 
and especially North-Rhine Westphalian municipalities we review the respective literature and 
develop a theoretical framework to derive our hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the data set and 
methodological considerations. Subsequently, the analysis is conducted and the hypotheses 
examined. This study concludes with a summary and the implications of the results. 
 
2.2 State of research 
German municipalities have to deal with a strong asymmetry in the fiscal autonomy of revenues 
and expenditure obligations (Diemert 2013: 85; Rösel 2017: 3) which leads to a de facto constraint 
on revenues (Rösel 2017: 7) while at the same time expenditure responsibilities increase due to 
economic crises, demographic changes and needful infrastructure investments. This limits the 
possibilities to generate revenues nearly exclusive to borrowing activities and consequently to an 
increase in public debt. As public debt is accompanied by debt servicing cost which further 
enhances fiscal distress on the expenditure side, many municipalities try to widen their scope of 
action by actively managing these debt portfolios (Trampusch/Spies 2015: 107). 
Public debt management for municipalities is a rather new but advancing phenomenon. The 
increasing debt levels of German municipalities motivated some NRW municipalities to outsource 
their debt management to the WestLB in order to manage their portfolio. In 2006 the WestLB 
managed around 6 billion Euros of municipal debt from up to 30 different municipalities. This 
exemplifies the municipalities’ will to optimize their portfolios and reduce interest burden 
(Trampusch/Spies 2015: 109). Moreover, the subsequent lawsuits between the municipalities and 
the WestLB with respect to financial losses out of high-risk derivative contracts impressively 
illustrate the financial risks involved in an active debt management. 
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Table 1 Municipal debt per capita as Länder means in 2015 
 Debt per capita Kassenkredite per capita in % 
Saarland     3,458.82 €      2,102.84 €  61% 
Rheinland-Pfalz     3,378.50 €      1,836.56 €  54% 
Nordrhein-Westfalen     2,799.18 €      1,475.96 €  53% 
Sachsen-Anhalt     1,394.23 €         636.28 €  46% 
Brandenburg        755.61 €         302.69 €  40% 
Hessen     2,950.34 €      1,055.99 €  36% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern     1,461.66 €         465.25 €  32% 
Niedersachsen     1,530.24 €         366.72 €  24% 
Schleswig-Holstein     1,435.96 €         244.83 €  17% 
Thüringen        914.13 €            83.09 €  9% 
Baden-Württemberg        566.12 €            19.30 €  3% 
Sachsen        708.60 €            23.47 €  3% 
Bayern        969.63 €            14.71 €  2% 
Sources: Data stems from The Regional Database Germany, “Jährliche Schulden der 
Gemeinden/Gemeindeverbände“(Code 71327) and „Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsstandes”(Code 12411). Own 
calculation. 
 
The extensive use of short-term debt is subject to a strong regional concentration (Geißler et al. 
2017: 35), as Table 1 illustrates. NRW municipalities have on average the third highest indebtedness 
in Kassenkredite per capita which account for over 50% of total debt. It is therefore a prominent 
example to illustrate is phenomenon. Short-term debt was nearly irrelevant until the mid-1990s but 
began to sharply increase from the beginning of 2000 (Rösel 2017: 1). Within the analyzed time 
period this progress continued (see Figure 1) and is equivalent to a rise of 30.39% within 5 years. 
 
Figure 1 Kassenkredite per Capita in NRW 
 
Sources: Data stems from The Regional Database Germany, “Jährliche Schulden der 
Gemeinden/Gemeindeverbände“(Code 71327) and „Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsstandes”(Code 12411). Own 
calculation. 
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The political economy of budget deficits is a widely discussed topic in political science. While on 
the national level a wide range of theories and studies analyze the reasons for differences in debt 
levels (for an overview see Alesina/Perotti 1995; Hallerberg/von Hagen 1999), the literature on 
subnational debt and especially municipal debt in comparison is rather scarce. This is even more 
the case for literature on public debt management of municipal debt portfolios. The studies of 
Birkholz (2006), Junkernheinrich and Wagschal (2014), Trampusch and Spies (2015) and Rösel 
(2017) include comprehensive overviews of the existing literature on the research topic of 
municipal debt and serve as a basis for the following literature review and hypothesis derivation. 
This includes the political economy literature on budget deficits, budget policy, public 
administration and public debt management. Furthermore, they show that (socio-) economic 
factors as well as political factors need to be taken into account to draw a comprehensive picture 
of fiscal activities in municipalities. We therefore divide this chapter according to these findings 
and derive hypothesis for economic as well as political variables. 
Economic variables 
Research on budget policies (e.g. Böttcher 2012) suggest and empirical studies on local public debt 
(Trampusch/Spies 2014; Rösel 2017; Benton/Smith 2014) show that the fiscal and economic 
situation (e.g. Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 2014) of the respective municipality is crucial to explain 
fiscal outcome and behavior. Based on the logic that a high level of indebtedness is associated with 
fiscal distress which encourages municipalities to reduce their interest payments, we assume a 
positive relation with the amount of short term debt. A high debt level is oftentimes connected 
with an annual deficit, due to high interest payments in relation to total expenditures and the 
amount of repayments. As deficits need to be refinanced and a high share of interest payments and 
repayments limits the fiscal scope of action, municipalities can be expected to use short term debt 
to reduce this costs.2 As shown by Pérignon and Vallée (2017), the level of indebtedness accounts 
significantly for the use of debt instruments associated with high risks. Pérez and Prieto (2015) find 
that regional governments do not seek to minimize risk but contrarily react to increasing financing 
needs with an increase in the use of short-term debt. They link these results with the prediction 
that subnational governments might expect a bail-out by the central government if they fail to 
refinance their outstanding debt. We therefore assume a positive relationship between directly 
debt-related indicators of fiscal distress and the use of short term debt. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Contrarily, one could also argue that a low share on interest payments is the consequence of a high share on short-
term debt because of lower interest rates. Nevertheless, as explained above we derive the stated hypothesis (H3) as we 
assume that the limited scope of action motivates municipalities to actively change their debt portfolio. 
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H1: The higher a municipality’s debt level in terms of debt per capita, the higher the share of short-term debt. 
H2: The higher a municipality’s annual deficit in terms of deficit per capita, the higher the share of short-term debt. 
H3: The higher the share of interest payments on total expenditures, the higher the share of short-term debt. 
 
The literature on Kassenkredite (Herrmann 2011; Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 2014; Rösel 2017) 
shows that even though these special instruments are meant to ensure liquidity, they are nowadays 
used to finance municipalities’ expenditures permanently. Simultaneously, the relative use of long 
term debt instruments has declined. Long term debt is usually connected to medium to long-term 
investments which have declined within the last decade (Boysen-Hogrefe 2014). As short-term 
debt instruments are not a suitable strategy to carry out a sustainable investment-related budget 
policy because they are not connected to specific assets (Diemert 2013: 86), we assume a negative 
relationship between investment expenditures and the use of short term debt. 
 
H4: The higher the quota of investment expenditures on total expenditures, the lower the share of short-term debt. 
According to the literature on public debt management it is not only important to analyze which 
instruments are used to finance public debt but also to understand who the respective creditor is 
(e.g. Benton/Smith 2014). As short term debt such as Kassenkredite is usually lend by Sparkassen 
and other non-public creditors we assume that a general dependency on non-public creditors, 
represented by the share of non-public creditor debt on total debt, is positively related to the share 
of short term debt. 
 
H5: The higher the quota of debt borrowed from non-public creditors, the higher the share of short-term debt. 
 
Besides these budgetary and partly technical indicators, studies also have shown that socio-
economic factors can have a significant influence on fiscal outcomes. They show for example that 
the unemployment rate affects the level of public debt (Boysen-Hogrefe 2014) or the use of specific 
debt instruments (Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 2014). While social security spending within the 
German federal system is partly carried out on the local level (Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 2014: 
316) and can at least marginally be controlled by local governments (Böttcher 2012: 68), the 
resulting expenditures are likely to influence fiscal decision-making. In contradistinction to e.g. 
investment expenditures which can be deferred, municipalities do not have the right of refusal with 
respect to social spending. 
 
H6: The higher the rate of unemployment, the higher the share of short-term debt. 
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Political variables 
Several studies have shown that partisan effects impact fiscal outcomes for example due to strategic 
or opportunistic behavior or diverging fiscal preferences (e.g. Alt and Lassen 2006; for an overview 
see Eslava 2011). Even though the fiscal scope of action for municipal councils is limited (e.g. 
Trampusch/Spies 2015: 115) ideological differences turn out to be significant for the fiscal deficit 
(Rösel 2017) as well as the usage of instruments (for Kassenkredite see Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 
2014). Furthermore, Timm-Arnold (2011) as well as Böttcher (2012) state that even if socio-
economic and institutional factors are very similar, differences in the budgetary situation, namely 
the deficits, are observable and concludes that political decision-making has to be factored in. 
While theoretical considerations on the influence of partisan effects towards debt levels predict 
that left-wing governments tend to accept higher debt levels (e.g. Eslava 2011), the effects on the 
use of different debt instruments are empirically contested. Benton and Smith (2014) identify the 
existence of partisan effects for Mexican municipalities. They show that right-leaning parties are 
not only connected to a lower per capita debt but also tend to use more cost-efficient debt 
instruments than left-leaning parties. A similar approach is made by Wagschal and Junkernheinrich 
(2014) who hypothesized that left-wing parties are using more short-term liquidity credits 
(Kassenkredite) than right-wing parties. Even though their results do point in this direction the 
effects are not statistically significant. 
 
H7a: If right-wing parties have the absolute majority within a local council the use of short-term debt is higher. 
 
In contrast to these findings Sáez (2016: 48) states that right-wing parties have a preference for 
higher expenditures on debt servicing cost to “depict themselves as being fiscally responsible” and 
refers to this outcome as fiscal conservatism effect. He succeeds in establishing this effect in his 
study on subnational debt in India. As both lines of argument and the respective findings seem to 
be applicable for the use of short-term debt we also derive a contesting hypothesis. 
 
H7b: If right-wing parties have the absolute majority within a local council the use of short-term debt is lower. 
 
Besides the municipal council, also the mayor position is involved in fiscal decision making. As 
Junkernheinrich and Wagschal (2014) show the mayor’s partisanship influences the use of 
Kassenkredite. While left-wing mayors are likely to have a positive effect on the amount of this short-
term debt instrument the opposite holds for right-wing mayors. With the reform of the municipal 
code of NRW in 1999 the mayor’s position was considerably strengthened (Rösel 2017: 10). As 
Böttcher (2012) points out a strong positon of the mayor strengthens budgetary discipline and 
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reduces deficits. Moreover, a good election result may discourage the incumbent mayor to run 
fiscal risks. Given the increased importance of the mayor and the important role for local public 
finances of this office, we also check for party effects and election results for the position of the 
mayor. 
 
H8: Right-wing mayors tend to accept a lower level of short-term debt than left-wing mayors. 
H9: The better the mayor’s election result the lower the share of short-term debt. 
 
The operational aspect of municipalities’ fiscal and especially borrowing activities is carried out by 
the treasurer. The municipal code of NRW distinguishes between a constituted and a 
commissioned treasurer. While the first is appointed by the municipal council the latter is directly 
commissioned by the mayor (Trampusch/Spies 2015: 114). According to Boettcher (2012: 71) the 
possibility to enforce budgetary discipline is strengthened by a high political power of the 
administrative, in this case the mayor and the treasurer. As a high share of short-term debt is linked 
to fiscal risks and difficulties in long-term budgetary planning we assume that a treasurer directly 
commissioned by the mayor leads to a lower share of short-term debt. 
 
H10: If the treasurer is commissioned by the mayor, the share of short-term debt is lower. 
 
Besides these political and institutional aspects we also want to factor in how municipalities behave 
with respect to public debt management decision making. Based on a survey by the Association of 
North-Rhine Westphalian Taxpayers in 2009 we use the decision on entering swap transactions in 
the past as a proxy for the willingness to take risk in order to minimize debt servicing cost. The 
risk which accompanies these financial transactions is prominently pointed out by several studies 
(e.g. Trampusch/Spies 2015; Lagna 2016; Piga 2001) and can therefore be interpreted as an 
indicator for financial risk attraction. 
 
H11: If a municipality has used swaps in the past, the share of short-term debt is higher. 
 
2.3 Data and Method 
The composed data sets covers 392 municipalities in NRW for the years 2010, 2012 and 2014. All 
debt data is taken from a census on the debt portfolios of German municipalities provided by the 
Research Data Center of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder.3 
                                                 
3 EVAS 71327 Jährliche Schulden der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände, 2010-2014. 
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This dataset contains the amount of all debt instruments hold by German municipalities and 
counties. To our best knowledge, this dataset has so far only been used descriptively. The 
dependent variable short-term debt is the sum of all short-term debt instruments with a maturity 
up to one year. This includes short-term liquidity credits (Kassenkredite), credits from the public 
sector (e.g. central government, state, etc.) and credits from the non-public sector (especially 
banks). In contrast to studies which analyze the amount of specific debt instruments or the total 
debt level, we do not operationalize our dependent variable as debt per capita. As we are interested 
to determine which factors explain the composition of municipalities’ debt portfolio, we 
operationalize the dependent variable as the share of short term debt on total debt. Furthermore, 
this dataset allows us to differentiate between public and non-public creditor debt, which we 
operationalized as the share of non-public creditor debt on total debt. 
For this panel we merged data on the fiscal situation and budgetary outcomes, the political 
administrative and election results as well as specific data on the municipalities’ debt portfolio. 
Data on fiscal and budgetary matters are taken from North-Rhine Westphalian Agency of 
Information and Technology’s (IT.NRW) database on public finance.4 The total amount of debt 
and deficits, computed as the difference of total expenditures and revenues, are coded per capita 
to account for the different sizes of municipalities. Payments on interest, investments and debt 
repayment expenditures are calculated as quotas on total expenditures while transfer represents the 
share of obtained transfer payments on total revenues. Furthermore we computed the 
unemployment rate as the share of unemployed on a municipalities’ population.5 
Political variables on the municipal council and the election results of 2009 are also taken from 
IT.NRW.6 Data on the municipal administration (mayor and treasurer) stem from Trampusch and 
Spies (2015). Since 1999, the mayor of NRW municipalities is directly elected. Therefore, besides 
the party membership we also use the respective share of votes to operationalize the strength of 
the mayor’ position by its election result. To account for party effects we code a right-wing 
dominance if the aggregated share of votes of CDU and FDP are above 50%. If SPD and Gruene 
hold more than 50% of the municipal council it is coded as left-wing dominated. Within our data 
sample 201 municipalities are governed by a CDU mayor and 100 by a SPD mayor while the 
remaining mayors have no direct partisanship. With respect to the municipal councils in 198 
municipalities CDU and FDP hold the majority whereas this is only in 35 municipalities the case 
for SPD and Gruene. Furthermore, we combine these variables and control for cases where the 
mayors party also holds a majority within the city council. As the legislative period on the municipal 
                                                 
4 Landesdatenbank NRW Code 71517 Vierteljährliche Kassenergebnisse, Sektor Kommunen. 
5 Unemployment statistics for the respective years are available via the Federal Employment Agency. 
6 Landesdatenbank NRW Code 14431 Kommunalwahlen – Gemeinderatswahlen. 
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level on NRW covers five years, the 2009 election covers the complete period of analysis. Also 
based on Trampusch and Spies (2015), we control for the use of SWAPS. These data is based on 
a survey carried out by the Association of North-Rhine Westphalian Taxpayers in 2009. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive the specific timing of these transactions. Nevertheless, 
as this study aims towards and explanation for differences in the trade-off between financial risk 
and cost optimization, the use of derivatives allows conclusions about a municipality’s general risk 
preference in order reduce interest rates and payments. 
 
Table 2 Mean values of short term debt 2010-2014 
Year Share on Total Debt Short-term debt per capita 
2010 0.2039 533.95€ 
2012 0.2663 648.95€ 
2014 0.3248 787.05€ 
   
Source: Data stems from Research Data Center of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder 
EVAS 71327 “Jährliche Schulden der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände”, 2010-2014. Own calculation. 
A first view on the compiled dataset shows that short-term debt has increased within the analyzed 
period. This holds for the relative share on the debt portfolios as well as the amount of short-term 
debt per capita (table 1). For the year 2010 we identify 257 out of 390 analyzed municipalities which 
used short-term debt instruments. As a value above 0 in our dependent variable is only observable 
in 65.9% of these cases, we have to account for this left-skewed data fraction (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Fraction of the data 
 
Source: Data stems from Research Data Center of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder 
EVAS 71327 “Jährliche Schulden der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände”, 2010-2014. Own calculation. 
Municipal Debt Management   29 
Following Khumawala et al. (2016) and Pérignon and Vallée (2017) who analyze the debt structure 
of French municipalities for the use of high-risk structured loans, we differentiate between the 
usage of short-term debt and the magnitude of this usage. To account for the first we use a probit 
model to explain on a binary level why 65.9% of the municipalities use short-term debt instruments 
while the rest does not. To examine why municipalities which use short-term debt differ in the 
magnitude of this usage we compute a tobit model left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 1. For 
each of the three models (economic, political, and combined) we compute both analyses with 
clustered standard errors at the municipal level. As we are interested in the effect sizes, we use 
standardized values for all non-dummy independent variables. 
 
2.4 Analysis 
Due to the number of variables that have to be tested and in order to analyze the derived hypothesis 
we elaborate multiple models. While the first model (M1 and M2) contains the economic aspects 
of this analysis the second model (M3 and M4) deals with the political variables. Subsequently, 
model 3 (M5 and M6) is a combination of the previously significant variables and represent the 
final model.7 To account for fraction of the data (see Figure 2) and to find a satisfactory answer to 
both aspects of the initially raised questions, for every model we differentiate between a probit 
model (M1, M3 and M5) to identify the factors which explain the use of short-term debt and a 
tobit model (M2, M4 and M6) to explain why municipalities use short-term debt instruments to a 
different extent. The results are displayed in Table 3. 
Economic model (M1+M2) 
M1 and M2 analyze the effects of the economic variables on the use of short-term debt. The 
economic model shows that debt per capita and a high share of non-public creditor debt have a 
positive and highly significant effect on the decision of whether or not using short-term debt. The 
more a municipality is indebted and relies on non-public creditors, the more likely it is to use short-
term debt in general. Additionally, if the municipality is a city (Kreisfreie Stadt) this probability is 
significantly increased. 
  
                                                 
7 The displayed effects remain stable if the model is calculated as a complete model, including all previously analyzed 
variables. 
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Table 3 Regression analysis 
Economic model Political model Combined model 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
 Usage 
(probit) 
Magnitude 
(tobit) 
Usage 
(probit) 
Magnitude 
(tobit) 
Usage 
(probit) 
Magnitude 
(tobit) 
Economic factors  
Debt 2.282*** 0.233***   2.332*** 0.234*** 
 (0.281) (0.024)   (0.282) (0.022) 
Non-public creditor 0.533*** 0.160***   0.549*** 0.156*** 
 (0.071) (0.015)   (0.069) (0.014) 
Deficit 0.007 -0.013     
 (0.048) (0.009)     
Interest payments -0.676*** -0.097***   -0.745*** -0.106*** 
 (0.154) (0.018)   (0.150) (0.018) 
Repayment 0.094 -0.006     
 (0.079) (0.011)     
Investment expenditures -0.279*** -0.081***   -0.262*** -0.075*** 
 (0.066) (0.013)   (0.064) (0.012) 
Transfer revenues -0.031 0.008     
 (0.063) (0.006)     
Unemployment 0.043 0.018     
 (0.095) (0.015)     
Political factors 
CDU/FDP majority  -0.482** -0.140** -0.241 -0.047 
   (0.168) (0.046) (0.139) (0.026) 
CDU mayor   0.128 -0.023   
   (0.189) (0.043)   
Independent mayor  -0.030 -0.034   
   (0.207) (0.055)   
Mayor election   -0.017*** -0.004*** -0.009 -0.002* 
   (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Congruence   -0.052 0.022   
   (0.197) (0.048)   
Treasurer   -0.174 -0.035   
   (0.137) (0.035)   
SWAPS   0.623*** 0.134*** 0.243 0.037 
   (0.128) (0.033) (0.146) (0.026) 
city 1.640*** -0.130 1.267** 0.239*** 1.560*** -0.144* 
 (0.271) (0.070) (0.390) (0.055) (0.221) (0.070) 
_cons 1.132*** 0.191*** 0.632*** 0.246*** 1.254*** 0.215*** 
 (0.130) (0.013) (0.166) (0.046) (0.177) (0.023) 
sigma  0.258***  0.331***  0.257*** 
_cons  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
N 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 
pseudo R2 0.441 0.551 0.146 0.176 0.454 0.565 
Sources: Research Data Center of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder EVAS 71327 
“Jährliche Schulden der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände”, 2010-2014. Landesdatenbank NRW Code 71517 
“Vierteljährliche Kassenergebnisse, Sektor Kommunen“, 2010-2014. Federal Employment Agency unemployment 
statistics 2010-2014. Landesdatenbank NRW Code 14431 Kommunalwahlen – Gemeinderatswahlen. Trampusch and 
Spies 2015. 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Our hypothesis on the level of indebtedness (H1) is confirmed by these findings which are in line 
with previous results on the role of debt level for the use of high-risk associated debt instruments 
(Trampusch/Spies 2015; Khumawala et al. 2016) and especially of short-term debt instruments 
(e.g. Junkernheinrich/Wagschal 2014; Rösel 2017). The effect size demonstrates the importance of 
this factor for the decision-making to use short-term debt as well as the magnitude. The effect of 
non-public creditor share points in the expected direction and affirms our assumption (H6) that an 
increased dependency on non-public creditors increases the share of short-term debt on the total 
debt portfolio. 
Even though the variables deficit, share of repayments on expenditures and the unemployment 
rate have a positive coefficient these effects are rather small and statistically not significant. 
Although we expected a positive relationship between the annual deficit and the share of short-
term debt (H2), our results do not support this assumption. This indicates that even though short-
term credits are meant to fill in for liquidity shortages the usage as well as the magnitude is 
independent from the current budgetary situation and confirms Birkholz’s (2006) statement that 
especially Kassenkredite are nowadays diverted from its intended use towards a permanent financing 
instrument. 
Contrarily, the share of interest expenditures on total expenditures as well as the share of 
investments on total expenditures have a negative and highly significant effect on the probability 
of using short-term debt instruments as well as the extent of usage. The quota of received transfer 
payments does not affect the share of short-term debt. The effect of the share of investments on 
total expenditures is theoretically to be expected (H4) and confirms the assumption that sustainable 
long-term investments activities are negatively associated with short-term debt credit financing. 
The negative effect of interest payments is surprising. On the one hand, it confirms the 
considerations of reducing interest payments by the use of short-term instruments, on the other 
hand it contradicts the hypothesis that municipalities which face a budget limitation due to high 
interest payments are more likely to use instruments associated with low servicing cost (H3). As 
the result is highly significant, it seems that due to cost minimization the effect of using short-term 
debt instruments reduces budgetary constraints due to interest payments. This confirms our initially 
raised assumption that municipalities are willing to significantly increase their vulnerability towards 
short-term changes in interest rates in a trade-off to lower interest payments in order to increase 
their fiscal room to move. 
All of the significant effects persist in the tobit model (M2) which analyses the magnitude of using 
short-term debt instruments. Surprisingly, the city effect changes its impact from positive to 
negative. So, the probability of using short-term debt in general is increased if the municipality is a 
city but the magnitude of this usage compared to the total debt portfolio is decreased. A highly 
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indebted city, which finances its debt by non-public creditors while spending less on investments 
and interest payments is likely to use short-term debt instruments. 
Political model (M3+M4) 
The models M3 and M4 show the effects of political factors on the usage and extend of short-term 
debt instruments. The coefficients on the variables CDU mayor and the previous use of swaps are 
positively associated with short-term debt, but only the latter is statistically significant. This 
confirms our hypothesis (H11) that municipalities which use derivatives, in this case swaps, also 
are more likely to engage in risks which may result out of short-term indebtedness. On the other 
hand usage and magnitude of short-term instruments are negatively related with a right-wing 
majority in the local council and a strong position of the mayor. These effects are highly significant 
in both models. The result for the effect of party effects sheds light to our contested hypothesis 
(H7) about the role of parties in the choice of debt instruments. Similar to previous results on the 
use of Kassenkredite and the effects on the debt level, right-wing majorities decrease the probability 
and the extent of short-term debt. One the one hand, this finding supports Saez’ (2016) argument 
of fiscal conservatism according to which right-wing parties are willing to accept higher debt 
servicing costs. One the other hand this results contradicts the theoretical expectation that right-
wing governments prefer less public spending which would lead to a higher share of short-term 
debt in order to reduce interest payments. In the case of public debt management, it seems that 
this does not hold if debt instruments imply budgetary risks. 
Although the mayor’s partisanship does not have a significant influence on short-term debt, the 
mayor’s election result has a small but statistically significant negative effect on the use and the 
extent of short-term debt (H9). This indicates that a mayor whose position is strengthened by the 
election result is less interested in minimizing debt servicing cost but more aware of the 
accompanying risks which, in case of occurrence, could endanger a possible reelection. 
Nevertheless, party congruence between the mayor and the council majority does not affect the 
share of short-term debt significantly. 
The treasurer’s status has a negative effect on the use and the extent of short-term debt if the 
treasurer is constituted by the council, even though this effect is not statistically significant. 
Contrarily to the economic model, the city dummy is positive for the magnitude of short-term 
debt, which means that in this model the effect of a municipality being a city not only increases the 
probability of using short term-debt instruments but also increases the share of these instruments 
within the overall debt portfolio. 
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Combined model (M5+M6) 
The combined model (M5 and M6) brings together the significant factors from our economic as 
well as political considerations. With respect to the economic model all effects remain significant 
for the usage as well as the magnitude of short-term debt. Nevertheless, combining both models 
leads to a decrease in significance of the political factors. Moreover, the effect sizes decrease 
considerably. This is in line with the result of previous studies taking into account economic as well 
as political factors which mostly conclude that the debt level and the usage of risk associated debt 
instruments is mainly driven by economic factors (e.g. Trampusch/Spies 2015). In the final model 
only a strong election outcome of the mayor still has a significant negative effect on the extent 
short-term debt usage. 
In sum, the combined model confirms our previous results that indebtedness, a dependency on 
non-public creditors and a certain risk attraction approximated by the previous use of derivatives 
increases the usage and the extent of short-term debt instruments while the share of interest 
payments and investment expenditures from the budgetary side as well as a strong election result 
of the mayor have a negative effect. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this study we analyzed the variation in usage and extent of short-term debt instruments across 
municipalities in North-Rhine Westphalia. We find that the share of short-term debt heavily 
depends on a municipality’s indebtedness and the reliance on non-public creditors. Moreover, it is 
negatively connected to the share of interest and investment expenditures. From a political 
perspective, a right-wing majority within the municipal council and a strong election result of the 
mayor decreases the probability of using short-term debt and its extent, while the previous use of 
swaps as an indicator for risk attraction increases the probability of short-term debt usage and its 
magnitude. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of our political variables is small as these political 
effects disappear when economic and political factors are combined. 
Our findings have several implications for public debt management of municipalities. We show 
that the use of short-term debt instruments is associated with a lower share of interest payments 
on the municipalities’ budget. This in line with our assumption that municipalities use the lower 
interest rates on short-term debt instruments to reduce their budgetary expenditures. Nevertheless, 
the reliance on short-term debt decreases predictability of future interest expenditures because of 
their dependency on refinancing. This increases the vulnerability to changes in interest rates 
dramatically while also shortening the time to react to these changes. This holds especially for 
highly indebted municipalities which have to refinance a significant amount of debt on a regular 
basis. As economic factors turn out to be the main drivers for using short-term debt, it is not to be 
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expected that this progress will significantly change within a short time. In combination with the 
negative impact on investment expenditures, the fiscal distress of NRW municipalities is more 
likely to tighten up even more as a high level of indebtedness makes it difficult to conduct long-
term investments for example in infrastructure which could improve their fiscal performance in 
the future. Given these findings and previous research on municipal debt structure, it has to be 
stated that a certain misappropriation of short-term debt instruments is observable. In sum, the 
underfinancing of municipalities and the missing autonomy on shaping expenditures and revenues 
leads to optimization of debt portfolio and the use of innovative financial instruments like 
derivatives to reduce debt servicing cost. This may add to the risk of local public budgets which 
are in the end financed by taxpayers. 
From a political perspective, we assume that political variables may have altering effects in different 
Länder as NRW is an example for a competitive-democracy which is characterized by more 
powerful parties and local councils to the disadvantage of the mayor (Holtkamp 2006; 
Bogumil/Holtkamp 2013). This would explain why the analyzed mayor variables have only slightly 
or no effect on the share of short-term debt. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of all political 
variables is considerable low which indicates that the chosen variables do not grasp the 
phenomenon entirely and therefore do not allow to draw conclusions about the causal factors 
behind municipal debt management. Further research should extend the period of time as well as 
municipalities from different states to account for institutional differences. This holds especially 
with respect to auditing aspects as pointed out by Rösel (2017) for local debt in NRW. As we could 
identify a relationship between the share of non-public creditors and the share of short-term debt, 
research on the influence and structure of the banking sector might provide valuable knowledge 
about the variance of municipal debt portfolios. Furthermore, research on the use of long-term 
debt instruments with floating and variable interest rates is needed to assess the degree of 
municipalities’ dependency and vulnerability towards interest rate changes on financial markets as 
shown by Pérignon and Vallée (2017) for French municipalities. 
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Abstract 
Existing research on public debt has largely neglected the institutions governing its management. 
This article is the first to provide data and conceptual footage on the multidimensional autonomy 
of public debt management offices (DMOs) which actively operate in financial markets to refinance 
public debt and raise funds to meet public financial needs. While autonomy from the political 
process is deemed necessary to fulfil their assigned tasks effectively, less political control can imply 
substantial budgetary risks. Countries apparently handle this trade-off very differently as we find 
variance in overall DMO autonomy. Disaggregating the measurement unfolds that DMOs 
separated from departmental structures have more decision-making competencies while also being 
less controlled by ex-post reporting obligations. However, regarding policy autonomy which 
represents the leeway in interacting with financial markets all DMOs, independent from their legal 
status, score equally high which raises further questions for the democratic legitimacy of modern 
public debt management. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the deregulation of financial markets has furthered their international integration 
and provided governments with easier access to international capital (Trampusch 2015: 3). These 
developments have also been accompanied by ever-increasing degrees of sophistication and 
complexity in financial management, as well as a higher level of competition with which 
governments have to cope. In many other policy fields, a similarly shifting environment has induced 
governments to introduce changes to their mode of governance which have included institutional 
and organizational rearrangements that in some cases contained delegation of competencies to 
newly established entities. Prominent examples are national regulatory competencies, redesigned 
into agencies with some degree of autonomy (Thatcher 2002). These autonomy augmenting 
processes, however, inherently bear a critical relationship. On the one hand, granting autonomy is 
not only prerequisite to creating credible policy commitments and avoiding political uncertainty, 
but is also deemed necessary to pursue policies in complex environments more effectively and 
efficiently by enhancing professionalism and flexibility (Thatcher 2002: 132). On the other hand, 
lack of political control over policy implementation raises concerns regarding accountability and 
democratic legitimacy (Verhoest et al. 2004). 
As with other state competencies, the way public debt was managed was changed primarily because 
of the growing complexity of the environment. Many governments in OECD countries deemed 
institutional reforms in public debt management (PDM), particularly the creation of highly 
specialized debt management offices (DMOs), necessary to cope with the increasing technical 
challenges of financial markets (Missale 2012) and to adopt innovative financial market techniques, 
such as the use of derivatives (e.g. Fastenrath et al. 2017). The World Bank, IMF and OECD which 
function as international best practice and guideline setters for PDM recommend a certain degree 
of autonomy from the political sphere in order to execute debt policies on financial markets more 
professionally and efficiently (Cassard and Folkerts-Landau 1997; Currie et al. 2003: 17; OECD 
2002: 41). That said, the institutional design of DMOs is far from being homogenous which already 
manifests itself in the selected legal status. Some countries delegated PDM to DMOs located within 
the departmental structure of their ministry of finance or treasury (MDMOs) while others created 
agencies outside the given governmental body (SDMOs). 
The delegated market-oriented management of the sovereign debt portfolio might involve 
substantial risk-taking on behalf of the state and is potentially detrimental to the public budget, 
which is predominantly a sovereign right of the parliament. Consequently, it is striking that political 
science research has not yet provided a differentiated assessment of the autonomy of DMOs 
beyond a superficial distinction between MDMO and SDMO (e.g. Currie et al. 2001; Golebiowski 
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and Marchewka-Bartkowiak 2011). Given that all DMOs fulfill the same core task, refinancing 
public debt at lowest possible cost, and that all are active and even compete on the same 
international financial markets the questions arise whether the degree of autonomy differs between 
DMOs within and DMOs outside departmental structures and if so which characteristic differences 
in autonomy result from their varying institutional settings? 
With the creation of professionalized DMOs, delegation as a key characteristic of global regulatory 
capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005) has also become a main feature of modern PDM in most OECD 
countries. In this study we link considerations on independent regulatory agencies (IRA) and 
central bank independence (CBI) from delegation theory with the literature on agencification. 
While delegation theory (e.g. Thatcher and Sweet 2002; Gilardi 2002; Maggetti 2007; Hanretty and 
Koop 2013) is suitable to describe the delegation of crucial tasks from the political sphere towards 
independent agencies and provides a solid theoretical basis to assess these organizations, we use 
the literature on agencification (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2004; Moe 2013; van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014) 
to describe and analyze the competencies delegated to DMOs as these are not regulatory but 
executive in nature. Even though DMOs do not regulate, but actively participate at financial 
markets on behalf of the state, the rationale behind the process of delegation is quite similar. A 
higher or lower degree of autonomy from the political sphere mediates credibility towards financial 
market actors with regard to a consistent debt management strategy while the increasing complexity 
of financial markets and its instruments requires a significant amount of expertise which might be 
difficult to establish within the government itself. 
Derived from these theoretical considerations we elaborate a multi-dimensional measurement 
concept for DMO autonomy which is especially valuable for analytical purposes (Hanretty and 
Koop 2013: 199). Applying a multidimensional concept of autonomy contributes to our knowledge 
about DMOs’ autonomy beyond the formal legal status which is often criticized as being an 
insufficient measure of autonomy (e.g. Maggetti 2007; Verhoest et al. 2004; Bach 2014) and seldom 
match with factual autonomy (e.g. Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008). Moreover, by ascertaining the 
composition of autonomy we are able not only to map the specific combination of granted 
competencies and imposed constraints but also to identify the underlying factors of similarities and 
differences. In this way we seek to take account of the discrepancy between the almost identical 
highly technical tasks DMOs execute in common markets and the present variety of formal status 
and institutional settings. 
We find that DMO autonomy is continuously distributed and more complex than stated by 
previous studies, although SDMOs are on average more autonomous than MDMOs. Thereby 
SDMOs’ higher autonomy manifests itself mainly in looser constraints on self-determined decision 
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making rather than in decision-making autonomy itself. Surprisingly the degree of DMOs’ policy 
autonomy is nearly equivalent, independent from the legal status. Moreover, our results show that 
despite the inherent risk of the delegated task the average autonomy of decision-making is relatively 
high, while especially SDMOs only face a low degree of reporting and auditing obligations. 
The paper proceeds with a brief summary of institutional reforms in PDM and a review of what 
little coverage it has attracted in the literature. Second, we discuss general theoretical considerations 
from delegation theory and agencification literature of independent regulatory agencies and other 
state agencies to derive hypotheses about the DMOs’ autonomy and its composition. Third, out of 
these theoretical considerations we elaborate a multi-dimensional concept of DMO autonomy and 
derive indicators mainly from the IRA and CBI literature. Fourth, we provide a descriptive analysis 
of the data and close with a conclusion. 
 
3.2 Institutional reforms in public debt management 
Public debt management (PDM) functions used to be simple, rather passive operations (Currie et 
al. 2003: 15), historically spread across different institutions – typically the ministry of finance 
(MoF),8 the central bank or a central depository (Borresen and Cosio-Pascal 2002: 18; IMF and 
WB 2003). They were predominantly driven by macroeconomic welfare considerations, such as tax 
smoothing (Fastenrath et al. 2017). However, with the increasing sophistication and international 
integration of financial markets, the deteriorating credibility of the separation between monetary 
and debt policy, and the rising risk and cost profiles of public debt portfolios, many OECD 
countries deemed it necessary to redefine the institutional and organizational mandate of PDM 
(e.g. Blommestein and Turner 2012; Currie et al. 2003; Wheeler 2004). 
Starting in the late 1980s, a paradigm shift to cost-risks optimization approaches that mimic 
portfolio-management practices in the private sector took place (Currie, et al. 2003: 15). 
Accordingly, tasks previously distributed among various public organizations were centralized into 
highly specialized debt management offices (DMOs) (Currie et al. 2003; Piga 2001) which were 
organizationally located within or outside of the MoF (Borresen and Cosio-Pascal 2002: 17). All 
PDM functions were bundled into highly specialized DMOs. In either way, since then DMOs have 
actively operated in financial markets on behalf of governments with a closer market focus 
(Wolswijk and de Haan 2005: 4). This meant that not only the personnel from but also the practices 
common to private financial institutions, such as the use of innovative and sophisticated financial 
                                                 
8 Note that we use the term ‘ministry of finance’ regardless of the country-specific name for the ministry commissioned 
with the affairs of public finance. 
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instruments like derivatives or debt buy-back transactions, had been accommodated, all with the 
aim to optimize cost–risk structures of public debt portfolios (Fastenrath et al. 2017). 
Greater technical efficiency and professionalism in the DMOs were regarded as imperative for 
success and were to be achieved by separation from the ‘political process’ (Cassard and Folkerts-
Landau 1997). This would enable debt managers to shake off bureaucratic shackles and achieve 
managerial goals like attracting and hiring qualified staff (Currie et al. 2003: 16), thus furnishing the 
necessary analytical capacity (Borresen and Cosio-Pascal 2002: 1). Second, operating procedures 
could be more flexible (Piga 2001: 17), establishing an environment conducive to the quick 
decision-making demanded by the dynamics of financial markets (Currie et al. 2003: 16). Third, 
DMOs would be spared political pressures that focus, especially in times of crises (Missale 2012: 
173), on reducing short-term debt-servicing costs in order to relax budget constraints at any price 
(Cassard and Folkerts-Landau 1997; Currie et al. 2003: 17). Indeed, the OECD guidelines on PDM 
recommend that DMOs ‘should have sufficient autonomy from the political sphere’ (OECD 2002: 
41). 
However, DMO autonomy might evoke principal–agent problems detrimental to public financial 
management. First, greater independence from the principal, the MoF, might induce a DMO to 
prioritize its own interests instead of working on the best outcome for its ministry. It might become 
too focused on trading activities and attach too much importance to its status in the eyes of its 
financial counterparts, such as investment banks (Magnusson 2001: 12). It might, greater 
professional expertise notwithstanding, underestimate or even ignore some aspects of fiscal risks 
(Magnusson 2001: 13), violating the premise of incorporating the government’s tolerance for risk 
at all times (IMF 2014: 33). These aspects became even more problematic when DMOs started to 
use sophisticated debt instruments that entail higher contingent risks (Piga 2001). Second, DMO 
autonomy might imply an incremental loss within the MoF of competence and knowledge about 
financial markets that are of great importance for matters like privatization of state-owned 
companies or law reforms affecting the bond market (Magnusson 2001: 13). Hence, governments, 
and especially MoFs, have to decide carefully how autonomous DMOs should be, given how 
closely their activities and responsibilities are intertwined with those of the MoF. 
 
3.3 Theory and hypotheses 
Autonomy of public organizations which carry out public services or tasks is a widely discussed 
research area in several fields such as delegation theory as well as the literature on agencification. 
The most prominent examples of studying delegation theory are research on central bank 
independence (CBI) and the autonomy of independent regulatory agencies (IRA). While delegation 
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theory explains delegation of competencies by solving problems of time inconsistency (e.g. Eckert 
2017) and credibility (e.g. Thatcher and Sweet 2002), the literature on agencification emphasizes 
the importance of performance and efficiency gains due to specialization (Verhoest et al. 2004: 101). 
Even though the described process of reforming PDM by delegating this crucial tasks to 
professional and highly specialized public organizations shares many similarities with central banks 
and IRAs the delegated task itself differs substantially which impacts the underlying logic of 
delegation towards autonomous public organizations. As DMOs do not regulate financial markets 
but execute policies agencification seems to be a more suitable framework for DMOs at first glance. 
Nevertheless, even though delegation theory might not be suitable to explain the delegation of 
PDM towards DMOs it is suitable to provide a solid theoretical framework to describe and analyze 
public organizations’ characteristics and the process of delegating competencies from the political 
sphere towards (autonomous) public organizations. As this study’s aim is to analyze how delegation 
of PDM to public organizations which vary in their institutional setting impacts DMO autonomy 
we link the literature on agencification with considerations out of delegation theory. While the 
literature on agencification helps us to understand the motives of delegation, delegation theory 
provides the theoretical framework on how to analyze autonomy.9 
The definition of an agency varies substantially across countries and political systems (Roness 2009: 
1). A commonly used definition is provided by Thatcher and Sweet (2002: 3) who define non-
majoritarian institutions as “governmental entities that (a) possess and exercise some grant of specialized public 
authority, spate from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed 
by elected officials”. While this broad definition focusses mainly on the separation of the organization 
from processes of election a finer grained summarization for agencies is given by Roness (2009: 1) 
who characterizes agencies as bodies of public law which are “structurally disaggregated from the core of 
their ministry”, possess a certain degree of autonomous decision-making power while being under 
some control from ministries but expecting continuity over time and dispose of own resources. 
Moe (2013: 1162) describes the legislature’s decision to create an agency as a make or buy decision 
while highlighting that there is always the possibility of internal production. Therefore, the decision 
to delegate is a calculation of costs and benefits. In that sense costs refer to the possibility of 
deviation between the outcome intended by the elected officials and the actual generated outcome 
by the agency, the so called agency loss (Thatcher and Sweet 2002: 4). The benefits from delegation, 
on the other hand, are seen in the possibility of better policy outcomes (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2004: 
102). To prevent the first political control is needed, while the latter requires a certain degree of 
                                                 
9 Even though these literature strings are not completely distinct from each other, the literature on delegation towards 
central banks and IRAs focusses on the regulatory aspect of delegation, while agencification and delegation to non-
majoritarian institutions is a broader approach which can also be applied to public organizations which are of executive 
nature. 
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autonomy. This relationship results in a complex trade-off between political control and agency 
autonomy (Christensen and Lægreid 2007: 502) to ensure the agency’s ability “to use its expertise 
effectively” (Moe 2013: 1160). Empirical studies on the autonomy of agencies show that this trade-
off and the resulting degree of autonomy vary substantially across countries, sectors and even 
within sectors (e.g. Gilardi 2002; Verhoest et al. 2010; Eckert 2017). 
Analyzing autonomy also involves the relationship between de-jure and de-facto independence 
which is contested as these seldom match. Studies analyzing these relationships find that higher 
formal independence does not automatically involve higher de-facto independence (e.g. Verhoest 
et al. 2004; van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014). Besides the question of generalizability of this finding 
across countries and especially sectors with different regulatory or executive tasks (including the 
question of different types of public organizations) the underlying definition and operationalization 
of these terms differ substantially. De-facto independence of IRAs in delegation theory can be 
defined as political independence (Hanretty and Koop 2013: 196) which means “the degree to which 
the agency takes day-to-day decisions without the interference of politicians”. Even though this definition of de-
facto independence is quite convincing, empirically it requires that these daily business decisions 
and operations need to be observable. This holds especially if independence from politicians is 
considered unidimensional as stated by Hanretty and Koop (2013: 199). However, they also admit 
that besides this consideration a distinction between different aspects of independence can be 
valuable for analytical purposes. A different conceptualization of analyzing independence can be 
based on decision-making autonomy. Verhoest et al. (2004) distinguish between autonomy defined 
by decision-making competencies and autonomy resulting from the absence of constraints on 
decision-making. While the first refers to the shift of competencies towards the agency and 
reduction of (ex-ante) approval requirements, the latter describes possible constraints due to 
financial dependency, a governmental majority in supervisory boards or simply the possibility to 
intervene ex-post by sanctions (Verhoest et al. 2004: 104ff.). This understanding of autonomy as a 
multi-dimensional concept is taken up in several studies which identify the formal-legal status as 
an insufficient characteristic to describe the relationship between public organizations and their 
parent ministries (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2004; Pollitt 2005; Maggetti 2007; van Thiel and Yesilkagit 
2008; van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014; Bach 2014). Consequently, the concept provided by Verhoest 
et al. (2004) captures these considerations and state that autonomy can be composed of different 
aspects of autonomy such as managerial, policy, financial, legal, interventional and structural (e.g. 
Verhoest et al. 2004). Moreover, perceiving autonomy as multi-dimensional implies that “different 
combinations of agency autonomy are possible” (Bach 2014: 344). 
Applying these theoretical considerations to DMOs as public organizations has some implications 
for the construction of an appropriate theoretical framework for DMO autonomy: (1) Even though 
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the relationship between politicians and agencies might be unidimensional in practice (Hanretty 
and Koop 2013) for the analytical purpose of examining the impact of different institutional 
settings on DMO autonomy a multi-dimensional concept of autonomy is needed to identify varying 
combinations of agency autonomy across different types of DMOs. (2) De-jure independence of 
public organizations can differ substantially from its de-facto independence. Therefore, using the 
formal-legal status without considering de-facto independence is insufficient to analyze the 
relationship between DMOs and the MoF. (3) Concepts of de-facto independence from the 
delegation theory on IRAs are not directly transferable towards DMOs as the nature of their day-
to-day decision-making is not regulatory but executive in nature. In contrast to decisions on market 
regulation, DMOs daily operations on financial markets are usually subject of non-disclosure. We 
therefore follow Verhoest et al. (2004) concept of autonomy that is differentiated between 
autonomy as the level of decision-making competencies and autonomy as the exemption of 
constraints on the actual use of decision-making competencies. 
Taking these considerations into account we formulate three hypotheses that associate the legal 
status with the overall autonomy as well as with specific components of autonomy. Although 
formal-legal status is criticized for being insufficient as a standalone characteristic does not 
automatically lead to its irrelevance (Hanretty and Koop 2013: 197). Given that DMOs which are 
located within the MoF are organizationally closer to the core administration and elected 
politicians, their formal-legal status is less autonomous in comparison to DMOs outside the MoF. 
From a delegation perspective, the delegated task towards a non-majoritarian institutions is some 
steps down the chain of delegation (Pollack 2002: 215). We therefore assume that: 
H1: DMOs within the MoF have an overall lower degree of autonomy. 
The process of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions such as agencies typically involves 
transferring a mandate towards the agency. The delegator thereby tries ex-ante to shape this 
mandate as precise as possible to prevent agency losses (Eckert 2017: 2). As a result the delegated 
task is more explicit because of clearer objective settings (Thatcher and Sweet 2002: 19). 
H2: SDMOs have less autonomy in policy making due to a more explicit mandate and objective 
setting. 
Thatcher and Sweet (2002: 19) state that agencies are obliged to justify their decision-making and 
to publish information. Reporting obligations in that sense can be seen as a form of an ex-post 
control instrument for agencies (Verhoest et al. 2004: 106) in order to ensure that the delegated task 
is carried out in the way the delegator intended to. Hanretty and Koop (2013: 207) find that 
organizations with higher formal independence, in this case DMOs outside the MoF, are subject 
to more reporting obligations. 
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H3: SDMOs have to fulfill greater reporting obligations which enhances ex-post control and leads 
to less interventional autonomy. 
 
3.4 Conceptualization of DMO autonomy 
Since there is still no generally accepted methodology on how autonomy should be conceptualized 
and operationalized (Gilardi and Maggetti 2011: 212; Irian and Ledger 2013: 3), we elaborate a 
systematic concept of autonomy for DMOs, following Goertz (2006) by conceiving it as a 
multilevel construct. Based on the theoretical considerations on delegation theory and 
agencification we elaborate a multi-dimensional concept of DMO autonomy that allows us to 
analyze variation not only within the same formal legal types, but also across and on single 
dimensions of autonomy (Verhoest et al. 2004: 110). At the indicator level we derive items 
analogous to studies on central bank independence, independent regulatory agencies and state 
agencies as these research fields similarly focus on highly specialized bodies that hold extensive 
public authority while enjoying a certain degree of autonomy in the public sector. We identify the 
main characteristics attached to the various concepts of autonomy in the literature, systematically 
examine them at every level and address their application to DMOs. Figure 1 presents our resulting 
DMO concept, consisting of five dimensions with their respective indicators. 
 
Figure 3: Concept structure of DMO autonomy 
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3.4.1 Abstract level 
Although concepts of autonomy carry various labels in different academic fields, their 
constructions at the abstract level are aimed at explaining the same constellation (Maggetti and 
Verhoest 2014: 2). Regardless of whether it is framed as ‘independence’ (e.g. Grilli et al. 1991), 
‘discretion’ (Gilardi and Maggetti 2011: 211–13) or ‘bureaucratic autonomy’ (Maggetti and 
Verhoest 2014: 1), the continuum between the negative and positive poles of the concept is 
described by the extent to which preferences are endogenously formed by the organization itself 
and translated into authoritative actions without external constraints imposed by politicians or 
other actors (Gilardi and Maggetti 2011: 211–13; Maggetti 2007: 272; Maggetti and Verhoest 2014: 
239). We use the term ‘autonomy’, but refrain from adding adjectives (such as ‘bureaucratic’), 
because they might induce its perception as a subtype with altered concept intension and extension 
(Goertz 2006: 76ff). 
In principal–agent terms, studies of central bank independence regard the government as the 
relevant actor (Arnone et al. 2006), while the literature on the independence of state agencies 
additionally endorses the idea of multiple political principals (e.g. Wonka and Rittberger 2010), as 
well as the agency’s capture by non-political counterparts (e.g. Gilardi and Maggetti 2011). Since 
PDM functions exert a strong influence on the business of and are closely intertwined with the 
responsibilities of the MoF, it is important to focus on DMOs’ relation to their respective MoF to 
account for the political ties attached to them. 
3.4.2 Dimensional level 
Each concept is defined by its constitutive dimensions, which function as a theoretical linkage 
between the abstract basic level and the concrete indicator level (Goertz 2006: 242-53). The 
dimensions can be clustered into two groups: the first deals with the decision-making competencies 
of an agency, while the second relates to how far the government might constrain the use of these 
autonomous rights. The systematic approach of Verhoest et al. (2004), largely building on 
Christensen (1999), not only underlines the importance of distinguishing between these two areas, 
but also differentiates within them, as shown in Figure 1. 
Decision-making autonomy results from the shift of competencies from the government to the 
agency that are concerned with the agency’s internal operational and organizational management. 
The agency’s autonomy is thereby enhanced since the extent of ex-ante controls and approval 
requirements is reduced (Verhoest et al. 2004: 104). As a complementary part, constraints on 
decision-making competencies takes into account to what extent an agency can effectively use the 
delegated competencies without governmental interference. Financial dependence on central 
budget resources, the government’s ability to appoint or dismiss the agency’s head as well as 
50  Autonomy of Public Debt Management Offices 
 
structural political influence via the board of the agency depict the possible constraints on decision-
making. Moreover, ex-post control systems through reporting and audit obligations might limit the 
agency’s ability to fully make use of the delegated competencies. Consequently, even though an 
agency has complete autonomy in decision-making, its actual autonomy from the government can 
be influenced to due constraints on these decisions (Verhoest et al. 2004: 105). 
3.4.3 Indicator level 
In the first part of our autonomy index, two dimensions delineate the level of decision-making 
competencies possessed by DMOs. Three indicators cover the scope of the first, managerial 
autonomy, which, essentially, is concerned with the choice and use of inputs (Verhoest et al. 2004: 
105). The “primary input factors” of a DMO’s work can be divided into the two spheres of capital 
and human resources. It is important to establish whether DMOs, like most public agencies 
(Ellison 1995: 167), are dependent on elected legislators for appropriations or autonomous in their 
financial management (Indicator I.1). Furthermore, as many DMOs document in their annual 
reports, IT infrastructure plays a crucial role in the quality and robustness of debt management 
policies (see also Borresen and Cosio-Pascal 2002: 9); Indicator I.2 therefore captures how DMOs 
select their IT system. Analogously, the employment of appropriately qualified and competent 
professionals is key for effective PDM operations (Andabaka and Švaljek 2012: 77+85), so the 
DMO needs to be able to offer competitive remuneration schemes (Cassard and Folkerts-Landau: 
1997). Autonomy in human resource management (Indicator I.3) is also characterized by the ability 
to determine the timing and extent of recruitment (Trondal 2008: 473). Contrarily, control over 
personnel is a well-known instrument used by elected politicians to control permanent 
bureaucracies (Thatcher 2005). 
The second dimension concerns the question of how far agencies can develop and implement 
PDM policies autonomously. The life cycle of a policy can be broken down into four parts. To 
achieve long-term objectives, medium-term strategies are established, which are themselves the 
basis for particular short-term targets (IMF 2014: 24). Finally, specific instruments are used to 
achieve the targets.10 Strategies are illustrated, for example, by plans to reduce average debt 
maturity, while targets would define specific year-end numbers. Since DMOs might have freedom 
of maneuver at any of these stages, each of these four elements is translated into an indicator of 
so-called ‘policy autonomy’. We examine not only who is responsible for approving all these policy-
related formulations, but also who gears prior settings in order to establish agenda-setting powers. 
                                                 
10 Melecky (2012) and IMF (2014) ascribe substantial importance to the composition of PDM strategies and targets 
for the underlying goals.  
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Indicator II.1 represents the long-term time frame of policy formulation; it also covers the number 
of objectives, since that is a potential source of political interference (Fry et al. 2000). Indicators 
II.2 and II.3 correspond to the medium- and short-term period, respectively, relating to the 
formulation of strategies and their quantified targets.11 Indicator II.2 includes tactical trading in 
PDM, sometimes referred to as beat-the-market strategies, as a possible gateway for DMOs to 
unilaterally follow diverging policies. Lastly, Indicator II.4 captures day-to-day debt-management 
operations through debt instrument selection: who lays down the overall instrument portfolio and 
who decides on its actual usage. A DMO might, for example, be constrained by the instruments it 
has at its disposal, such as derivatives or buy-back operations, but need no approval for their 
concrete application. 
The first circumstance that might impose constraints on the actual use of decision-making 
competencies hinges on the allocation of authority over a DMO’s financial resources. A DMO may 
very well be heavily influenced by whether its financial endowment is fully at the courtesy of the 
MoF or regulated to be outside the MoF’s reach. This does not only include the dependency on 
the yearly funding decisions but also the capacity to rule over the usage of revenue. Both aspects 
composite the dimension of financial autonomy (Verhoest et al. 2004: 106). Hence, the Indicator 
III.1 describes the origin of the budgetary allocation whereas Indicator III.2 classifies whether a 
DMO is allowed to keep profits for their own disposal. Especially the later might affect a DMO’s 
risk taking in asset management considerably as, for example, derivatives on debt financials could 
be a great source of profits. 
Indicator IV.1, ‘Interventional autonomy’ (Verhoest et al. 2004: 106), is determined by the existence 
of possible sanctions and the extent of ex post reporting requirements, evaluations, and audit 
provisions. An agency might refrain from using its decision-making competencies if its actions will 
be evaluated on a priori set of norms, deviation from which may lead to sanctions or intervention 
by its parent ministry.12 For DMOs, ex post reporting requirements might be extensive and results 
might be examined against specific benchmarks. Sanctions might be a useful threat in order to 
assure or incentivize that performance doesn’t fall short to its benchmark. 
An additional dimension to constraints on actual use of decision-making competencies is the 
notion of structural autonomy, the extent to which the agency is shielded from influence through 
lines of hierarchy and accountability (Christensen 1999). In particular, it is concerned with the 
appointment and removal procedures of the agency head, in our case the chief executive officer 
                                                 
11 Grilli et al. (1991) were the first to measure central bank autonomy in setting objectives, which they framed as political 
features, in contrast to economic and financial features. 
12 Ex ante and ex post controls are often applied to reduce bureaucratic drift: that is, the difference between policies 
enacted by the principal and what is actually implemented or executed by the agent (Majone 2001: 103). 
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(CEO) of the DMO, who to some extent shapes a bureaucratic organization’s capacity for effective 
performance (Moe 2013). Political principals might alter a CEO’s behavior, especially through 
recruitment practices of patronage or threats of dismissal. When these processes are completely at 
the discretion of the parent ministry, to the point that there are no formal requirements for the 
CEO’s qualifications (Wonka and Rittberger 2010), no obligation to political independence (Gilardi 
2002; Grilli et al. 1991), nor legal provision for when and how CEOs can be dismissed, then CEO 
autonomy (Indicator V.1) is notably low. 
The same criteria hold for Indicator V.2, which relates to the autonomy of the executive or 
governing board of a DMO.13 The presence of this type of board is a deviation from typical 
departmental hierarchy that often manifests itself in the responsibility of appointing the agency 
head, who has an obligation to heed the board on important policy and/or administrative matters 
(Christensen 1999: 12–13). Even though it is contested whether merely inserting a (governing) 
board can be perceived as enhancing autonomy (see Verhoest et al. 2010 versus Bach 2010), DMO 
structural autonomy would be low if a board is staffed with MoF representatives, compared to its 
opposite pole of one composed of financial market practitioners with no political agenda. 
 
3.5 Data and operationalization 
As we strive to capture the autonomy of DMOs beyond their legal status, , we supplement the 
mere consultation of legal documents by conducting an in-depth review of, first, operational 
documents such as annual and quarterly reports, debt-market-related publications, and newsletters; 
and second, documents from external sources such as audit or parliamentary reports. The derived 
granular data underlines that especially with regard to features of operational and organizational 
management these documents are instrumental in complementing data extracted from the legal 
framework and further help us to cross-reference our findings. 
However, this comprehensive deep dive into the construction of DMOs comes with a high price. 
Since official information on PDM and DMO arrangements is scarce country selection is mainly 
driven by data availability. Beginning with high income OECD countries to ensure comparability, 
our sample encompasses the countries for which a sufficient amount of data is available, namely 
Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, and the UK. Other countries, such as the USA, could unfortunately not be included in 
this study because of the lack of sufficient data. Furthermore, information on our indicators is 
                                                 
13 Note that we only consider the arrangements of executive or governing boards since they have actual decision-
making power. Advisory and any other kind of supplementary or auxiliary boards are covered by Indicator IV.1, 
interventional autonomy. 
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predominantly available for only one point in time. This might be due to the absence of recurrent 
official statements, to once-only legislative acts that lay out most parts of the governance structure 
of DMOs with no successive alterations, or to sheer lack of full disclosure of year-specific 
governance issues. Hence, we consider the most recent information as reasonable for aggregation 
and frame our index thereby as an up-to-date cross-country measure for the year of 2015. These 
limitations translate into a quite small sample size allowing us only to provide descriptive statistics 
with regard to our derived hypotheses. Consequently, our results should be understood as 
exploratory. 
We apply a systematic coding to our indicators and items, outlined in the Appendix. The contrast 
between the upper and lower end of each indicator and item is identical. If the discretion or control 
over a specific issue lies fully with the MoF, the item is coded as 0 (lowest level of autonomy). If 
the DMO takes decisions single-handedly and no strings are attached, indicators and items are 
coded as 1 (highest level of autonomy). As we seek to distinguish each configuration of autonomy 
as precisely as possible we divide the 0-to-1 spectrum into categorical values and follow Goertz’s 
strategy of treating concepts as dichotomous only in special cases (Goertz 2006: 34). Thus, within 
the given parameters, equal proportional intervals are applied for intermediate values of the 
indicators and items apart from a few exceptions. 
If indicators comprise several items, the value of the indicator is the mean of those items. For the 
dimensional level, the mean of all corresponding indicator values is computed. The aggregated 
composite autonomy index is calculated by the average over all dimensional values. Thus, all 
dimensions, and within the dimensions each indicator, receive equal weight, meaning that they are 
attributed the same relevance. This is indisputably an arbitrary combination of data that may have 
a significant impact on the final results of the study. Unfortunately, as our sample is small, we are 
not able to employ methods of factor analysis or item response theory for all of our indicators and 
items combined, as suggested by Hanretty and Koop (2012). We therefore follow the equal 
weighting strategy, as it is the most conservative way if one cannot be sure about the relevant 
contribution of items to the final composite index (Gilardi 2002: 880). 
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3.6 Analysis 
In order to establish a high level overview of DMOs’ endowment with autonomy Table 1 depicts 
the composite index that aggregates all autonomy dimensions. Ranking the analyzed DMOs by 
their respective autonomy value confirms our hypothesis (H1) that MDMOs in general have less 
autonomy than SDMOs. Nevertheless, looking at the country-specific index values, a high variance 
among them unfolds. 
Table 1: Ranking of DMO autonomy 
# Value Country MDMO/SDMO 
1 0.64 Austria SDMO 
2 0.50 Norway SDMO/CB 
3 0.48 Denmark SDMO/CB 
4 0.47 Ireland SDMO 
5 0.43 Sweden SDMO 
6 0.42 Australia MDMO 
7 0.40 France MDMO 
8 0.39 Portugal SDMO 
9 0.35 United Kingdom MDMO 
10 0.27 Germany SDMO 
11 0.18 New Zealand MDMO 
12 0.15 Italy MDMO 
 
The presented ranking also lists the legal status of each analyzed DMO. Clearly, the Austrian 
SDMO is by far the most autonomous; the MDMOs of Italy and New Zealand rank last, with 
hardly any autonomy at all (as Cassard and Folkerts-Landau (1997) suggest). However, the values 
of the two groups are not clustered around two distant levels, but instead distributed widely 
between the extremes. There is no clear water between them: the German and Portuguese SDMOs 
rank beneath the French and Australian MDMOs. Correspondingly, grouping the index values 
brings out that the mean value for the SDMOs is higher than that of the MDMOs (Table 2; last 
column). As previous research on DMOs has so far only differentiated between departmental 
and non-departmental forms of DMOs the variance in autonomy, ranging from 0.15 to 0.64, 
indicates that this dichotomous differentiation does not grasp this variation completely. In order 
to analyze the different forms of autonomy and their impact on the overall autonomy with 
respect to different institutional settings Table 2 maps the country-specific data on the 
dimensional and indicator level. 
  
Table 2: Data on the multidimensional autonomy of DMOs 
 
  MDMO SDMO 
Δ 
  Indicator AUS FR IT NZ UK Ø σ AUT GER IRL SWE POR DK NOR Ø σ   
I. Managerial Autonomy 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.33 1.00 0.72 0.39 0.83 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.90 0.13 0.19 
 
I.1 Financial Management 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.65   1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.89   0.24 
 
I.2 IT-Infrastructure 1.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.85   1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00   0.15 
 
I.3 Human Resource Management 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.65   0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.82   0.17 
II. Policy Autonomy 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.03 0.38 0.14 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.10 0.06 
 
II.1 Objective Formulation 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.13   0.25 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.19   0.06 
 II.2 Strategy Formulation 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.40   0.33 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.38   0.02 
 
II.3 Target Formulation 0.33 0.17 0.08 0.33 0.17 0.22   0.42 0.25 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.33   0.12 
 
II.4 Debt Instrument Selection 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.40   0.50 0.13 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.48   0.08 
III. Financial Autonomy 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.27 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.21 0.37 0.01 
 
III.1 Origin of Resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.29   0.29 
 
III.2 Entitlement to profits 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40   1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14   0.26 
IV. Interventional autonomy 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.30 0.11 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.43 0.19 0.13 
 
IV.1 Ex Post Supervision 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.30   0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.43   0.13 
V. Structural Autonomy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.15 0.67 0.23 0.21 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.18 0.36 
 
V.1 CEO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.50 0.17 0.67 0.17 0.42 0.75 0.75 0.49   0.49 
 
V.2 Board 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.46 0.14 0.68 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22   0.22 
    Average           0.30 0.13               0.45 0.11 0.15 
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With regard to managerial autonomy dimension, both, DMOs separated from the MoF (SDMOs) 
and DMOs located within it (MDMOs), are highly autonomous. With the exception of New 
Zealand, where the Treasury’s Deputy Chief Executive is inter alia responsible for managing the 
DMO, all agencies analyzed are capable of using and managing their own financial as well as human 
resources and IT infrastructure.14 The high degree of managerial autonomy indicates a high level 
of staff professionalization and flexibility in internal organization. Nevertheless, on average the 
score for SDMOs is higher than for MDMOs. This corresponds to the basic intention of these 
countries to reform PDM so that DMOs’ competitiveness in financial markets is strengthened. 
Interestingly, the relatively high standard deviation for managerial autonomy among the MDMOs 
(0.39) points to differences in bureaucratic practices of handling ministerial departments. 
Policy autonomy is considerably lower across all the DMOs than managerial autonomy. However, 
we observe increasing autonomy from the formulation of long-term goals to the implementation 
of specific operations. Whereas the setting and approval of objectives are predominantly carried 
out by parliament or the MoF, DMOs play a key role in both strategy formulation and debt-
instrument selection. Though debt-management strategies and the portfolio of disposable debt 
instruments need the MoF’s approval (except in New Zealand and Germany), DMOs are 
responsible for the development of strategies and for decisions about using authorized debt 
instruments. Hence, the crucial decisions about which strategies are available and how to achieve 
targets are mostly in the hands of the DMOs. This might reflect the greater complexity of these 
fairly technical activities, which may lie beyond the expertise of the MoF. This supposition is further 
supported by the findings that this dimension has one of the lowest discrepancies between 
MDMOs and SDMOs and that both groups are highly homogeneous. This conformity between 
MDMOs and SDMOs with regard to their autonomy in formulating and executing debt policies is 
independent from the respective legal status. This indicates a very similar need for flexibility in 
operational planning and execution in financial markets. 
Our data on financial autonomy show that the general budget of all MDMOs is determined by the 
MoF whereas some SDMOs have substantial discretion. In both groups the decision about 
entitlement to profits is usually made by the MoF. Greater autonomy in MDMOs, due to the 
arrangements in Australia and France, is observable. The Agence France Trésor, for example, has 
the leeway to invest any occasional surplus to their best advantage. This also explains the relatively 
high deviation across MDMOs on financial autonomy. All in all, both groups of DMOs are 
financially almost exactly equally autonomous. 
                                                 
14 This is unclear for Italy, which is missing the values for Indicators I.1 and I.2. Because of the high correlation 
between I.3 and the overall value for managerial autonomy, we extrapolated this value and that for Indicator III.2 for 
Italy. All other indicator values are available. 
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We observe a moderate degree of interventional autonomy, finding some control mechanisms in 
place. SDMOs are less constrained than MDMOs, surprisingly, considering the aspect of delegation 
to an agency outside departmental structures. While all MDMOs, except the UK’s, mandatorily 
evaluate their performance against a benchmark, only the German, Irish, and Portuguese SDMOs 
are required to do so. This contradicts our hypothesis (H3) which stated that SDMOs are subject 
to stronger reporting obligations and therefore have less interventional autonomy. Our data shows, 
that even though we would theoretically expect more ex-post control mechanisms for agencies 
which are separated from the administrative core the opposite is the case. 
MDMOs have no structural autonomy in relation to the MoF, since their CEOs are appointed 
directly by the MoF and the boards that few of them have are then of only an advisory character. 
The latter also holds for the SDMOs of Portugal, Denmark, and Norway. To account for the 
special cases of Denmark and Norway, which have their DMOs within the central banks, we coded 
Indicator V.1, CEO, as ‘board’ (0.75), since all decisions with regard to the CEO are directed by 
the central banks. Among the remaining SDMOs, Germany and Sweden are quite dependent, as 
only the CEO’s appointment doesn’t coincide with the election cycle. The same holds for their 
executive boards. Although the rules of appointment to boards are quite similar, political 
representation differs. Whereas Germany’s board consists of 100 per cent MoF employees, Sweden 
has no political representation on its board at all. Austria and Ireland have mixed boards consisting 
of financial market experts and MoF employees. 
Table 3: Decision-making autonomy and constraints on decision-making 
 MDMO SDMO 
  AUS FR IT NZ UK Ø AUT GER IRL SWE POR DK NOR Ø 
Decision-making 
(I+II) 
0.67 0.64 0.26 0.32 0.63 0.50 0.60 0.40 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.57 0.68 0.63 
Constraints on 
decision-making 
(III+IV+V) 
0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.66 0.18 0.31 0.24 0.15 0.42 0.38 0.33 
 
Finally, we aggregate the autonomy dimensions into the broader categories of decision-making 
competencies (managerial, policy) and constraints on the use of decision-making competencies 
(financial, interventional, structural) to highlight the major differences between SDMOs and 
MDMOs (Table 3). 
Table 3 shows that MDMOs as well as SDMOs have a considerable degree of decision-making 
autonomy and are relatively free from ex-ante approval requirements with respect to the delegated 
competencies. Even though SDMOs’ decision-making autonomy is slightly higher, the difference 
between the two types is relatively low. Considering that all DMOs act on (nearly) the same 
international financial markets and have to face similar environments and challenges this outcome 
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is reasonable but nevertheless surprising, given the variety of country-specific administrative and 
institutional settings and the range of possible arrangements of autonomy. The results show that 
the scope of action is very similar even though the legal status differs, which might indicate that 
the autonomy in decision-making is more task than status related. 
Considering constraints on the use of decision-making competencies as the governments’ 
possibility of controlling the execution of delegated competencies SDMOs higher autonomy is 
quite surprising. SDMOs are less restrained by governmental interference due to higher structural 
autonomy and fewer obligations to ex-post reporting and auditing. Given the highly sensitive 
subject of the delegated task, one would expect stronger constraints on decision-making eminently 
for DMOs that have higher organizational distance to the administrative core. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This study elaborated a multi-dimensional index to measure DMO autonomy towards the MoF 
and analyzed the variation in the composition of autonomy across different organizational types of 
DMOs. The results show that SDMOs are on average more autonomous than MDMOs even 
though there is no straight demarcation line between them. Moreover, the index unfolds a wide 
distribution ranging from 0.15 (Italy) to 0.64 (Austria) indicating that the underlying differences in 
autonomy are more complex as assumed by previous studies which perceived DMO autonomy as 
a dichotomous concept. 
The analysis of the disaggregated measurements shows that MDMOs as well as SDMOs are in 
general highly autonomous with respect to their decision-making competencies. Moreover, the 
difference between the two groups is very low which contradicts the theoretical expectation that 
SDMOs are in general more autonomous. Nevertheless, the homogeneity is understandable as all 
DMOs have to fulfil very similar tasks on the same international financial market. This is 
particularly evident in the case of policy autonomy. While objectives of PDM are set by parliament 
or the MoF, DMOs of both camps are highly autonomous in strategy setting and instrument 
selection which comprise the most crucial decisions in the interaction with financial markets. This 
might reflect the technical complexity of the delegated task and could also indicate missing 
expertise in the respective ministries. Hence, policy autonomy seems to be more determined by the 
task at hand than by the legal status of the executing entity. Furthermore, the conformity in 
formulating and executing debt policies underlines that a dichotomous approach is insufficient to 
analyze autonomy comprehensively as the degree of policy autonomy is independent from legal 
status. 
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Examining the constraints on the use of decision-making competencies demonstrates that all 
DMOs are under tighter limits which highlights the fact that their overall autonomy is 
predominantly scaled up by their broad decision-making competencies. In addition, differentiating 
between the groups shows that SDMOs are on average less restricted than MDMOs. This is quite 
surprising as installing constraints on decision-making corresponds to the possibility to influence 
the execution of the delegated task, a necessity which theoretically increases the further the agency 
is separated from the administrative core. Especially with regard to interventional autonomy one 
might have had expected SDMOs to be less autonomous due to a stronger need for formal control 
mechanisms (e.g. Currie et al. 2003, 9). But SDMOs are actually more absolved from ex-post control 
mechanisms such as reporting and auditing obligations. This finding is even more striking when 
considering the substantial inherent risk of public debt management which is ultimately only 
secured by the public. 
The presented results contribute to the perception that a unidimensional concept of autonomy 
based only on the legal status of an organization might serve as a proxy to roughly predict and 
categorize overall autonomy. However, caution should be exercised to derive further conclusions 
for the detailed characteristics of autonomy. Our findings strongly confirm that the formal legal 
status is insufficient for the analysis of agencies as it misses to reveal crucial organizational 
differences and particularly similarities resulting from different compositions of autonomy (e.g. 
Verhoest et al. 2004; van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014: 319). We claim that especially the differentiation 
between autonomy determined by delegated decision-making competencies and imposed 
constraints is essential to analyze agency autonomy. It allows to identify whether the constituent 
parts of overall variance are originated in varying degrees of ex-ante approval requirements or in 
distinct frameworks of constraints that embrace ex-post control mechanisms and sanctions. 
Consequently, this approach enables also to detect underlying similarities and can moreover be 
applied to organizations that fulfil the same core task regardless of their organizational type. 
Correspondingly, the finding that independent from legal status all DMOs are highly autonomous 
with respect to decision-making competencies contributes to the scarce literature on PDM from a 
political science perspective. Considering that PDM actions have a direct impact on public finance 
and mistakes might substantially influence future decisions on budgetary policy (Lemoine 2016), 
which is predominantly a sovereign right of the parliament, the question for democratic legitimacy 
becomes essential. This includes the fact that especially SDMOs have a relatively high degree of 
interventional autonomy meaning that governments do not fully make use of ex-post control 
options by setting reporting or auditing obligations, even though this is particularly recommended 
by PDM experts (e.g. Piga 2001; Currie et al. 2003). 
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Further research should for one part aim to scrutinize the causes for the differences in the 
institutional design of DMOs. A qualitative approach with an in-depth review of interests and 
actions might be beneficial since quantifiable data is very limited. . The finding of very similar policy 
autonomy suggests that reforms of PDM in several OECD countries and consequently the creation 
and design of DMOs might be subject to a diffusion process. This assumption is supported as 
international networks on the topic of PDM with particularly strong positions of international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank or the OECD are eager 
to function as guideline and best practice setters. In addition, taken into account that in many 
OECD countries the task of debt management was previously carried out by central banks, path 
dependency might serve as a valuable starting point for the explanation of differences in the 
autonomy of DMOs. 
As political scientists are increasingly interested in analyzing the financialization of the state and its 
public finances DMOs institutional design can be used for further investigations on countries’ 
sovereign debt management policy. Especially research on the making of PDM policy as a 
consequence of the budgetary process could shed some light on the role of the actors involved - 
or not involved - and furthermore on the legitimacy of risk taking by adopting financial market 
techniques. This includes the question to what extent PDM is subject of (parliamentary) control or 
more explicit whether or not parliaments or governments have the capacity to control DMOs’ 
actions given the increasing complexity of financial market activities.  
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3.9 Appendix 
Appendix A Codebook 
  Indicator   Item 
Numerical 
coding 
I. Managerial Autonomy         
 I.1 
Financial 
Management 
(1) Who controls the agency's budget?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
 I.2 IT Infrastructure (2) Who decides on the IT infrastructure? 
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
 I.3 
Human resource 
management 
(3) Who decides on human resource management?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
II. Policy Autonomy         
 II.1 
Objective 
Formulation 
(4) Who sets objectives?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (5) Who approves objectives?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
 
 
66  Autonomy of Public Debt Management Offices 
 
  Indicator   Item 
Numerical 
coding 
   (6) Number of objectives  
     >3 0.00 
     3 0.25 
     2 0.50 
     1 0.75 
     0 1.00 
 II.2 
Strategy 
Formulation 
(7) Who sets strategy?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (8) Who approves strategy?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (9) Is tactical trading formally stated?  
     no 0.00 
     yes 1.00 
 II.3 Target Formulation (10) Who sets targets?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (11) Who approves targets?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
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  Indicator   Item 
Numerical 
coding 
   (12) Who approves borrowing?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
 II.4 
Debt Instrument 
Selection 
(13) Who decides about the instrument portfolio?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (14) Who decided about the usage of instruments?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
III. Financial Autonomy         
 III.1 Origin of resources (15) What is the source of agency's budget?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
 III.2 
Entitlement to 
profits 
(16) Who decides about the use of profits?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Stated by Law 0.25 
     Debt Management Agency in agreement with 
Ministry of Finance 
0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
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  Indicator   Item 
Numerical 
coding 
IV. Interventional 
autonomy 
        
 IV.1 
Ex Post 
Supervision 
(17) Ex post obligations for supervision  
     Reporting, audit, benchmark evaluation and 
sanctions 
0.00 
     Reporting, audit and benchmark evaluation 0.25 
     Reporting and audit or reporting and 
benchmark evaluation 
0.50 
     Reporting 0.75 
     No ex post supervision 1.00 
V. Structural Autonomy         
 V.1 CEO (18) Who appoints the CEO?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Parliament 0.25 
     Ministry of Finance and Agency Board 0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (19) 
Does the term of office of the CEO coincide with the 
election cycle? 
 
     yes 0.00 
     no 1.00 
   (20) 
Is the CEO's political independence a formal 
requirement? 
 
     no 0.00 
     yes 1.00 
   (21) Is there a formal requirement for CEO qualification?  
     no 0.00 
     yes 1.00 
   (22) Who dismisses CEO?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Parliament 0.25 
     Ministry of Finance and Agency Board 0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (23) 
Does the law contain explicit provisions about the 
dismissal of the CEO? 
 
     no 0.00 
     yes 1.00 
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  Indicator   Item 
Numerical 
coding 
 V.2 Board (24) Who appoints the board members?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Parliament 0.25 
     Ministry of Finance and Agency Board 0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (25) 
Does the term of office of the board members coincide 
with the election cycle? 
 
     yes 0.00 
     no 1.00 
   (26) 
Is the board members' political independence a formal 
requirement? 
 
     no 0.00 
     yes 1.00 
   (27) Proportion of Ministry of Finance staff on the board  
     100% 0.00 
     >50% 0.25 
     50% 0.50 
     <50% 0.75 
     0% 1.00 
   (28) 
Is there a formal requirement for board members' 
qualification? 
 
     no 0.00 
     yes 1.00 
   (29) Who dismisses the board members?  
     Ministry of Finance 0.00 
     Parliament 0.25 
     Ministry of Finance and Agency Board 0.50 
     Agency Board 0.75 
     Debt Management Agency 1.00 
   (30) 
Does the law contain explicit provisions about the 
dismissal of the board members? 
 
     no 0.00 
     yes 1.00 
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Abstract  
Sovereign debt management (SDM) requires decisions about the composition and structure of 
central government debt. Nowadays, the process is delegated to professional debt management 
offices, which use complex financial instruments and resort to capital markets. While previous 
research has investigated variations in parliamentary control over budgetary policies, the control of 
parliaments over SDM has been neglected. This article suggests an initial index for measuring 
parliamentary control over SDM and applies it to original data from 17 OECD countries. It finds 
that countries adopt different means of parliamentary oversight and reveals cross-country variation 
according to types of democracy, levels of parliamentary power over budgets and fiscal (budget) 
transparency, the organizational structure of debt management as well as former central bank 
independence and patterns of financialization of SDM and the economy. These findings are of 
interest for research on parliamentary budgetary power, delegation and financialization. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Budgetary authority is the parliamentary right par excellence. As recent research on the fiscal and 
political consequences of the debt crisis and bail-outs in Europe indicate (Zahariadis 2013, Allers 
2015, Barbera et al. 2017), this right of parliamentary oversight should include public debt policy 
as well. Although such policies are strongly influenced by parliaments’ fiscal and budgetary policies, 
they also have their own dynamics, because debt policy comprises not only the level of debt but 
also its type (Fastenrath et al. 2017: 275), although this is often scantily addressed in political 
science. While parliaments can determine the level of debt by their taxation and expenditure 
policies, decisions about the type of debt, hence its composition and structure (hereinafter: 
sovereign debt management (SDM)) is independent of specific fiscal and budgetary decisions. 
Decisions on SDM are regulated in constitutions and until the 1980s were classically delegated to 
ministries of finance (MoFs) and central banks (Wheeler 2004: 50). Nowadays, particularly at the 
level of central governments, SDM is delegated to professional debt management offices (DMOs), 
which are authorized by legislation or ministerial decree to manage governments’ borrowing 
requirements and their financial risks. This study measures and analyzes cross-national variation in 
parliamentary control over SDM. It has developed an initial index for measuring parliamentary 
SDM control which is applied to an original data set for 17 high-income OECD countries for 
which cross-national variation in parliamentary control is further scrutinized. 
Whether parliaments are able to control SDM and how potential cross-national variation is to be 
explained are important questions to which more theoretical and empirical work should be 
dedicated. In the following we mention four reasons why these issues are of major interest for 
political science. 
The first reason is that several studies of parliamentary control over budgetary policies as well as 
fiscal and budgetary transparency (e.g. Lienert 2005; Wehner 2006; Alt/Lassen 2006) identify 
significant variation in parliamentary control over the public budget and this leads us to hypothesize 
cross-country variation in parliamentary SDM control as well. However, until now, this strand of 
literature has left parliamentary oversight of SDM by the wayside. Our study seeks to fill this gap. 
That SDM also opens up the chance for increasing use of creative accounting and fiscal gimmickry 
to refurbish public balance sheets by technical tricks of financial engineering (Alt et al. 2014; Irwin 
2012), makes research on this matter even more important. 
Secondly, such research might contribute to debates in delegation theory. This literature highlights 
how delegation to agencies and other executive bodies may create complex trade-offs between 
control, expertise, and efficiency for legislatures (Christensen and Laegreid 2007; Blom-Hansen 
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2013). In most countries, DMOs are either a specific and self-contained unit of the Department of 
Finance and hence still part of the ministerial administration, or separated and established as (more-
or-less) autonomous Separated Debt Management Offices (SDMOs)15. Christensen and Laegreid 
(2007: 501) state that the establishment of highly specialized agencies may not only lead to more 
efficiency but also be linked to a “reduced potential for effective political control and 
accountability”. This is especially so in policy fields with high technical complexity (Blom-Hansen 
2013: 431), which is typical for SDM. 
Thirdly, parliamentary oversight of SDM has become even more important as financialization has 
increasingly exposed public debt to capital market dynamics. As with financialization in the 
economy and the sector of individual households (Krippner 2005; van der Zwan 2014), SDM is 
challenged by financialization which means that governments (a) increasingly use market-based 
modes of refinancing and related financial market transactions such as the issuance of marketable 
debt and the use of auctions, and (b) in this context view debt as a liability portfolio which they 
seek to optimize by the diversification of interest rates, maturities or the currency risks of their 
loans through the use of complex financial innovations like derivatives (Fastenrath et al. 2017). The 
use of marketable debt instruments, which can be traded on secondary markets and include short-
term securities (mainly Treasury bills), medium-term securities or notes and long-term securities or 
bonds (incl. index-linked bonds i.e. bonds whose payments are related to a price index) (Fastenrath 
et al. 2017: Fn. 5), significantly increase governments’ capital market exposure. When governments 
act like private financial investors not only conflicts of interest may arise between the roles of 
governments as prominent financial market regulators but more parliamentary control over SDM 
may also be a way to strengthen political control over financial markets in general. 
The fourth reason is that although parliaments’ and DMOs’ interests should be identical (e.g. 
lowering interest payments)16, the financialization of SDM and its greater capital market exposure 
also bears substantial risks which in the end are secured only by the public budget. Hence, 
potentially negative unintended fiscal consequences should also draw our attention to 
parliamentary oversight of debt management. The case of Belgium exemplifies this very well. In 
the early 1990s the Belgium parliament experienced losses of between 44.3 and 53.8 billion BEF 
due to currency rate swaps (e.g. Australia had similar negative experiences). While the minister of 
finance stated that he was not informed about daily operations as this was carried out by the debt 
managers, the parliament was not informed about the their  financial operations at all and some of 
                                                 
15  An exception is Denmark where debt management is (still) delegated to the central bank 
16  Because of this potential identity of objectives between the principal (parliament) and the agent (DMO) we do not 
refer to principal agency theory in this study. 
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its members accused the government of speculating with the BEF (van Gerwen/Cassimon 2000: 
157-163, 170). After this incident, SDM became a salient issue in Belgium and institutional changes 
have been made which strengthened parliamentary control. 
Against the background of these debates in the literature on budget and fiscal policies, delegation 
and financialization, the lack of cross-national knowledge is not only surprising but also alarming. 
Based on the literature on non-majoritarian institutions and delegation (e.g. Majone 1998; 
Coen/Thatcher 2005; Gilardi 2002; Winzen 2012), we argue that parliamentary control over SDM 
can be measured by operationalizing the degree of transparency and accountability of DMOs and their 
activities vis-à-vis the parliament. We suggest a multi-dimensional index of 29 items grouped into 
four dimensions: Legal framework, organizational structures, implementation, and reporting. With regard to 
the analysis of cross-national variation and the exploration of probable reasons for variation, we 
analyze the relationship between parliamentary control over SDM and (1) different forms of 
democracy, levels of parliamentary budgetary power and fiscal transparency, and different 
organizational structures of DMOs, thus whether (more or less) autonomous SDMOs are 
established or not, and (2) central bank independence and the financialization of SDM and the 
economy. The first mentioned relationships are of importance as these are directly linked to 
parliamentary control itself and highlighted in the research on budgetary and fiscal policies or 
delegation theory while the latter are considered crucial by the SDM literature and research on 
financialization. 
Our results show that in all countries parliamentary control over SDM is limited. However, we 
identify different ways and multiple trade-offs between the four dimensions by which legislatures 
try to ensure transparency and accountability as well as variations in these across types of 
democracies, levels of parliaments’ power over the budget and their fiscal transparency, the degree 
of central bank independence in the 1980s and the financialization of SDM and of the economy. 
In addition, we find that SDMOs tend to exhibit lower levels of parliamentary control. 
Due to the moderate amount of research on parliamentary control over SDM and the pioneering 
character of this paper, we focus on descriptive inference and first explore potential causal factors 
of variation. Further research can refine our concept, gather data for additional countries and 
different points of time, and investigate in more detail issues of causal inference and thus conduct 
statistical testing for causal explanations of cross-national and longitudinal variation. 
This article is structured as follows. First, we elaborate a concept on which the index construction 
is based and describe the underlying dataset and its composition. In the following analysis we apply 
our index to the newly compiled dataset to analyze the degree of parliamentary control over SDM 
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and its variation across countries. Furthermore, we test probable reasons for cross-country 
variation. We conclude with a discussion of the results and their impact on future research. 
 
4.2 Concept and Indicators 
To develop an appropriate concept for measuring parliamentary control of SDM  we construct a 
three-level index following Goertz (2006). While the abstract term of parliamentary control 
represents the basic level, the secondary level functions as the “theoretical linkage between the 
abstract basic-level and the indicator/data level” (Goertz 2006: 53) and in our case is carried out 
along four dimensions which operationalize accountability and transparency. Finally, the indicator 
level implements the derived items. 
The abstract level requires a definition of “parliamentary control” in the area of debt management. 
Transferring Wehner’s (2006: 768) concept of parliamentary control over budgetary policy to the 
arena of debt management, this study defines parlamentary control over SDM as the parliaments’ 
“power to scrutinize and influence” debt management and “to ensure its implementation”. 
Following research on non-majoritarian institutions, delegation and agencification (e.g. Majone 
1998; Coen/Thatcher 2005; Gilardi 2002; Winzen 2012), DMOs can be viewed as non-majoritarian 
institutions “which by design are not directly accountable to the voters or to their elected 
representatives” (Majone 1998: 15). 
Bearing this in mind, we link the abstract with the indicator level by delegation theory. With regard 
to the secondary level of our index, delegation theory highlights that due to this missing direct link to 
voters, parliamentary control over non-majoritarian institutions depends not only on the degree of 
information disclosure by these newly created organizations and parliaments’ own expertise and 
knowledge of the matters delegated but also on the legislative mandate and formal controls which 
ensure that the non-majoritarian institutions act according to parliaments’ aims and objectives 
(Coen/Thatcher 2005: 340; Majone 1998: 13; Winzen 2012: 659-661). According to Hood (2010: 
889) “[a]ccountability broadly denotes the duty of an individual or organisation to answer in some 
way about how they have conducted their affairs” while “[t]ransparency broadly means the conduct 
of business in a fashion that makes decisions, rules and other information visible from the outside”. 
Following Mabillard and Zumofen (2016: 4) we also assume that “accountability is based on the 
idea of power transmission and delegation […]”. Consequently, this study measures parliamentary 
control over SDM by suggesting a set of items which operationalize the degree of transparency and 
accountability of DMOs and their activities vis-à-vis the parliament.17 We refer transparency and 
                                                 
17  Or as a former senior researcher at the IMF put it in an exchange we had with her/him on our topic: “If debt 
management is transparent then it is democratic”. 
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accountability not only to substantive aspects but to the procedural as well (Majone 1998: 20-21). 
Substantive aspects embrace the “expertise and problem-solving capacity” of non-majoritan 
institutions but as well “the precision of the limits within which … [they] are expected to operate” 
(Majone 1998: 21). Procedural issues capture whether an institution is established by a democratic 
statute or act which prescribes the agency’s legal authority and objectives, whether its decision 
making “follows well-defined procedures” or its heads are appointed by elected officials, monitored 
by politicians as well as open to judicial review. 
As Blom-Hansen (2013: 430) states, procedural control can be used by legislators to constrain 
agency policies. In accordance with these considerations, we distinguish between four distinctive 
dimensions which seek to measure DMOs’ transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the parliament 
in substantial as well as procedural terms. The first dimension, legal framework, captures 
constitutional and legal aspects which measure the parliamentary capacity and expertise in debt 
management and the legal room to move for DMOs; the second, organizational structures, embraces 
the DMOs’ internal composition and whether there are external control mechanisms; the third, 
implementation, refers to parliamentary capacities to control DMOs in their decisions and daily 
business; and the fourth dimension, reporting, measures DMOs’ reporting requirements. While the 
research on non-majoritarian institutions helps us to determine these four general domains from 
which indicators stem, the literature on budgetary rules (e.g. Lienert 2005; Wehner 2006) and SDM 
related publications (e.g. IMF 2014, IMF/WB 2003; INTOSAI 2007; OECD 2002; WB 2015) 
provide us with precise items to assess these four dimensions in the area of SDM. 
Given the limited space of this article we cannot discuss all 29 third level items individually but we 
explain the general idea and the measurement intention behind them (on the items see Table A, 
Appendix). 
The first dimension, legal framework, consists of 15 items. At the level of indicators, it picks up the 
fiscal and budgetary rules literature which argues that measuring parliamentary control rights and 
its institutional capacity to analyze budgetary data (in our context: debt data) is of crucial 
importance for measuring parliamentary power over the budget (Wehner 2006: 768). Consequently, 
this component also assesses the legislature’s role with respect to auditing, examining debt 
management and its capacity in the form of expertise from budget offices (Schick 2002: 31). Thus, 
do parliaments have the capacity to control and assess debt management issues in substantive 
terms? Furthermore, we take into account the suggestion of official and (semi-)academic 
publications on DMOs and SDMOs by IOs to measure the legal extent of DMOs’ activities, thus, 
the existence of legal debt limits, which span a legal framework for DMOs’ borrowing activities, and 
the process of borrowing authorization and legal restrictions on using financial instruments (IMF 
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2014: 20; e.g. by settings on legal restrictions of derivatives transactions, exposure limits, and 
contingent liabilities). 
The second dimension organizational structure operationalizes procedural and substantive 
transparency and accountability by capturing the DMOs’ internal construction and how far external 
control is installed. Our eight indicators of this dimension include the DMOs’ location (inside or 
outside the MoFs), which is considered a crucial aspect in SDM literature (e.g. Currie et al. 2003, 
Piga 2001), as well as the existence and role of an external board (IMF/WB 2003, Wheeler 2004: 
57) which can enhance SDM transparency. Furthermore, the appointment of the CEO is evaluated 
as this is frequently highlighted in the literature on regulatory agencies (e.g. Gilardi 2002, Thatcher 
2005). Rules on DMOs’ responsibility, its strategy approval and its code of conduct are analyzed 
as well. 
To operationalize the implementation dimension, we refer to four indicators which evaluate 
parliamentary control over the decision making in DMOs’ operational activities. Here, we consider 
different instruments like derivatives and buybacks as well as general borrowing approval and 
tactical trading and ask for the level of authorization (IMF/WB 2003: 84; IMF 2014: 32). Are 
parliamentary or ministerial decisions needed in the daily business or is the DMO itself in charge? 
This component especially strengthens the accountability of the index by evaluating decision-
making processes in daily operations (Coe et al. 2000). 
Finally, the reporting dimension measures if and to what extent the DMO is obliged to report its 
strategy (OECD 2002, IMF 2014: 18), the use of instruments (OECD 2002: 12) and financial risks 
(IMF 2014: 18, OECD 2014). For the fiscal and budgetary rules literature, the aspect of reporting 
is essential to ensure transparency with respect to budgetary policy (e.g. Alt/Lassen 2006). 
Moreover, reporting can function as an instrumental or structural mechanism to enhance 
accountability, for example, by the use of annual reports (Maggetti 2010: 4). 
 
4.3 Index construction and data set 
In contrast to previous studies on parliamentary capacity in budgetary policy and on fiscal 
transparency (e.g. Lienert 2005; Wehner 2006; Alt/Lassen 2006) both of which could rely on cross-
national survey and questionnaire data provided by the OCED or the World Bank, OECD-wide 
survey data on debt management procedures are not available. Therefore our study is based on an 
original data set which in a very time consuming process was specially compiled for this analysis. 
We gathered data for 17 OECD countries which cover different types of DMOs. The high income 
OECD countries for which a sufficient quantity of data on the respective indicators is available are 
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Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States.18 
This sample contains different types of developed capitalist economies and thus is suitable for 
cross-national comparison. The data presented here display the status quo and stem from sources, 
with just a few exceptions, not older than 2012. As sources we used legislative texts, ministerial 
decrees, official documents and reports, newspaper articles, official websites, as well as documents 
from the DMOs and other involved institutions. All coding was double checked by different coders 
and in cases of uncertainty verified by interviews (by phone or email) with the respective (S)DMOs 
and/or officials. Obviously, the limitation in data availability also constrained the selection and 
definition of our 29 indicators. 
All indicators are numerically and systematically coded, either binary (0; 1) or on a three-point scale 
(0; 0.5; 1). While 0 represents the lowest possible degree of control, a value of 1 means that the 
parliament has complete control of setting SDM, has the capacities to examine SDM specific 
strategies and reports, and is fully aware of the actions executed by the DMO. The intermediate 
coding of 0.5 accounts for the fact that for some indicators a simple binary coding is not sufficient. 
If for example neither the DMO nor the parliament is in charge but the MoF has decision-making 
power we code this indicator as 0.5, because the responsibilities of ministries are closer to the 
parliament than decision making within sub- or outsourced organizations. Each indicator consists 
of one item. The four dimensions are computed as the mean of the indicators used, so every 
indicator is treated equally within the respective dimension (Gilardi 2002: 880). The overall index 
for parliamentary control is the aggregated mean of the previously computed dimensions. Even 
though some studies on similar topics (e.g. Winzen 2012) do not use equal weights for all indicators 
and/or dimensions, we adhere to this ‘conservative’ method of aggregation as we do not have any 
conceptual nor theoretical footing which strongly supports the use of unequal weights (OECD 
2008: 31). 
 
4.4 Analysis 
Applying our overall index of parliamentary control (PCI) to the data set on SDM leads to the PCI 
values between 0.46 (France) and 0.26 (Denmark), as illustrated in Figure 1. Whereas the good 
democratic performance of France is difficult to interpret at first sight since the control of the 
French parliament over the budget is relatively low (Wehner 2006: 781), the low level for Denmark 
may be connected to the fact that in that country debt management is still delegated to the 
                                                 
18  Due to insufficient data (e.g. Greece) or a lack of comparability due to specific institutional characteristics (e.g. 
Switzerland) some OECD high income countries could not be analyzed. 
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independent central bank. The mean value of 0.37 and the standard deviation of 0.05 indicate that 
in all countries parliamentary control over SDM is rather low. Due to the lack of any theoretical 
work on this issue we cannot say for certain that the maximum index value of 1 is realistic or from 
a normative as well as practical point of view even useful.19 Nevertheless, with the exception of 
CEO and board appointments every item is in at least one case above 0 and therefore ‘used’ to gain 
parliamentary control. 
Table B in the appendix displays the country values in more detail and reveals substantial 
differences between and within the four dimensions. On average, parliamentary SDM control is 
more ensured by the requirements in the legal framework (average value: 0.57) than by the 
accountability and transparency of the reporting requirements (0.38) or the setting in the organizational 
structures (0.33) and in the implementation of SDM (0.22; Table 1). These differences between 
dimensions indicate that, while countries apparently achieve overall similar levels of parliamentary 
control, they employ different ways of granting control options over SDM. Some countries (e.g. 
Sweden, United States and Japan) exert control by setting a transparent and accountable legal 
framework, while countries such as Australia, Ireland and Canada focus on reporting to ensure 
transparency and accountability. 
Figure 4 Parliamentary control over SDM policy 
 
Sources: Own calculation. 
                                                 
19  We thank Renate Mayntz for warning us of this caveat. 
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As there is stronger cross-country variation along our four dimensions than overall, our following 
in-depth analysis focuses on relationships between these dimensions and types of democracies, 
parliamentary power over the budget, etc. This also allows us to scrutinize further the different 
ways countries adopt parliamentary control over SDM. We start with a closer look on how the four 
dimensions relate to each other. 
 
Trade-off between legal framework, organizational structure, procedure and reporting 
Table 1 displays substantial trade-offs between the different dimensions. If parliamentary control 
is ensured by setting a transparent and accountable legal framework, less control is needed with 
respect to reporting standards and implementation as the room to act is legally limited. The trade-off 
also applies to the relationship between reporting and implementation, as high reporting standards seem 
to compensate for less transparent and accountable implementation. If the daily business of DMOs 
is perceived as fast moving on financial markets, with less parliamentary control slowing down 
these daily operations, control by reporting can be regarded as a complement to enhance efficiency 
and democratic legitimacy as well. However, the positive correlation between organizational structure 
and implementation indicates that the more parliaments control DMOs’ organizational structure the 
more transparent and accountable DMOs operate in their daily debt management business.20 
 
Table 1 Correlations between Dimensions 
 Legal Framework Org. Structure Implementation Reporting 
Legal Framework X    
Org. Structure 0.2218 X   
Implementation -0.2559 0.4009 X  
Reporting -0.3176 -0.2797 -0.3989 X 
Mean values 0.57 0.33 0.22 0.38 
Sources: Own calculation. 
 
 
                                                 
20  We are aware that the identification of correlations and especially trade-offs raises the problem of substitutability 
(e.g. Winzen 2012: 661-662; Wehner 2006: 774). Nevertheless, we argue that the empirical observable trade-offs 
do not indicate substitutability as they do not exclude each other. Even though we find a negative correlation 
between legal framework and reporting, a combination of both is not only theoretically possible but also empirically 
observable (e.g. France, Italy or Portugal). Therefore, our dimensions do not substitute for each other by measuring 
the same aspect from different perspectives but show different possibilities of gaining control which can exist 
simultaneously. 
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Relationship between types of democracy and parliamentary control over debt management 
The fiscal and budgetary rules literature claims that parliaments’ power varies cross-nationally and 
across types of democracy (Wehner 2006, Lienert 2005). While in presidential systems (with the 
U.S. as prime example) parliaments dominate the budget-making process, in the Westminster 
model there is executive supremacy (e.g. UK, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia). Semi-presidential 
systems (e.g. Finland, France), representative parliamentary republics (Germany, Italy), and non-
Westminster parliamentary monarchies (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden) are 
somewhere between these two poles (Lienert 2005: 3). Applying this classification to our data 
shows that among these different types Westminster Democracies reach the highest level of 
parliamentary control (0.41) and Parliamentary Republic regimes the lowest (0.33), with Presidential 
(0.40), Semi-presidential (0.37) and Parliamentary Monarchy regimes (0.36) in between. 
 
Figure 2 Types of democracies on dimensional level 
 
Sources: Own calculation. 
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Analyzing the dimensional mean values for the different types of democracy we witness substantial 
differences. From Figure 2 it can be discerned that different types of democracy seek different 
ways to ensure parliamentary control over SDM. While – as to be expected because of the strong 
role of parliaments in the budget-making process – in the United States with its presidential system 
parliamentary control is ensured by a high value for legal framework (actually the US has the highest 
value within the whole sample). Westminster democracies do not regulate a transparent and 
accountable SDM via the respective legal framework or at least do so to a much lesser extent but 
instead ensure parliamentary control by reporting. With respect to the dimensions organizational 
structure and implementation we observe surprisingly similar approaches in Westminster and 
Presidential Democracies. 
As there are differences in parliamentary control over SDM among types of democracies, it raises 
the question whether there is a relationship between parliamentary budgetary control, fiscal (and 
budgetary) transparency and parliaments’ oversight over SDM. 
 
Relationship between parliamentary budgetary power, fiscal transparency and parliamentary control over debt 
management 
It seems natural that parliaments’ control over SDM as a part of public finance can be related to 
parliamentary oversight of the budget. We may suspect a positive relationship between 
parliamentary control of the budget and SDM which leads to the claim that budget regime tradition 
may explain variations in parliamentary SDM control. Likewise, a negative one is plausible as well: 
We could hypothesize that if parliamentary power over the budget is high, its power in controlling 
debt management is moderate and debt management needs no control because, as long as 
expenditures exhibit a high level of democratic legitimacy, borrowing money to finance these 
expenditures is not necessary. However, our findings on these relationships are very mixed. 
 
Table 2: Correlations between dimensions and parliamentary budget power 
 Wehner (2006) 
Index -0.28 
Legal Framework 0.61 
Organizational Structure -0.01 
Implementation -0.19 
Reporting -0.56 
Sources: Own calculation. The respective data for parliamentary budget power stems from Wehner (2006: 781). 
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As Table 2 shows, we find a negative correlation as our results turn Wehner’s (2006) index21 of 
legislative budgetary institutions on its head: Parliamentary competencies in budgeting do not lead 
to parliamentary power over debt management. We observe a negative correlation between 
parliamentary control over budgetary policy and parliamentary control over SDM (-0.28). While 
France leads in terms of SDM control it is ranked only next to last with respect to budgetary power 
in Wehner’s (2006: 781) index. Also in Sweden, the U.S. and Denmark parliamentary control over 
budgetary policy is considerably higher (Wehner 2006: 781) than over SDM. This confirms our 
assumption that it is important to differentiate between fiscal, budgetary and debt policies. 
However, we also identify a positive relationship between this indicator and legal framework (0.61) 
and a slightly negative relationship with implementation (-0.19). This could indicate a trade-off. On 
the one hand, parliaments which have a lot of control over the budget also set a transparent and 
accountable legal framework. On the other hand, controlling DMOs in their day-to-day business as 
well as by reporting obligations (-0.56) seem to be perceived as less important, as their scope of 
action is legally limited. 
 
Table 3: Correlations between dimensions and fiscal transparency 
 Fiscal Transparency Budget Transparency 
Index 0.19 0.17 
Legal Framework -0.16 0.06 
Organizational Structure 0.40 0.34 
Implementation 0.51 0.31 
Reporting -0.41 -0.34 
Sources: Data on Fiscal Transparency stems from Alt and Lassen 2006: 1415. Data on Budget Transparency stems from 
Bastida and Benito 2007: 680. Own calculation. 
 
How countries shape their budgetary processes is closely linked to fiscal (and budgetary) 
transparency. As Table 3 illustrates, fiscal and budgetary transparency correlates positively but only 
weakly with parliamentary control over SDM. This is not surprising as (1) fiscal transparency is not 
usually measured with respect to parliament but rather to the public and other institutions and (2) 
there is a difference between fiscal policy and public management which is often overlooked in 
political science. While fiscal transparency is perceived as a measurement of solid and accountable 
political work, public debt is not perceived as a high-profile policy and mainly falls below the radar 
of public opinion. With respect to the dimensions, we observe a positive correlation with the 
                                                 
21  We decided to take Wehner’s (2006) index for our analysis as his is a broader measurement of budgetary institutions 
than Lienert’s (2005) and methodologically further developed. 
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accountability and transparency of implementation (0.51 for fiscal transparency and 0.31 for budgetary 
transparency), while reporting is negatively correlated with fiscal (-0.41) and budgetary transparency 
(-0.34). This could indicate that internal implementation diffuses from given fiscal processes towards 
debt management but governments perceive a difference between reporting fiscal facts to the 
public and a more internal reporting of SDM to parliament. 
In sum, it seems that parliaments which exert a high control over the public budget exercise their 
judgement over SDM by setting a transparent and accountable legal framework. On the other hand, 
DMOs’ reporting of the executed SDM declines with tighter budgetary control and transparency. 
 
Variation across types of DMOs 
Our data show that parliaments’ power over SDM depends very much on the type of DMO. It is 
much higher in countries with DMOs inside the MoF or the Treasury (e.g. France, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Japan, New Zealand) than in those with SDMOs (e.g. Ireland, Sweden, 
Germany). This leads us to the conclusion that the type of DMO wipes out the effect of regime 
tradition as in Sweden where parliamentary control over the budget is much higher than in New 
Zealand and Ireland, which both conform to the Westminster model. Furthermore, the decision 
to found an agency outside the given ministerial structures to deal with financial markets could be 
interpreted as an intention to seize market opportunities by easing bureaucratic constraints. This is 
in line with the finding that SDMOs enjoy on average more autonomy than ministerial DMOs 
(Gross/Hoshmand 2016). Nevertheless, the combination of less control with a higher degree of 
autonomy bears substantial risks. Currie et al. (2003: 9) highlight this critical issue and recommend 
even more control over SDMOs. However, our results indicate that, in contrast to this 
recommendation, SDMOs are subjected to less control, at least by parliaments. 
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Figure 3 DMO Location on Dimensional Level 
 
Sources: Own calculation. 
 
Beyond these overall differences, we witness substantial differences between DMOs and SDMOs 
in the composition of parliamentary control (Figure 3). Both organizational types have similar legal 
frameworks but differences in the other dimensions. While SDMOs are on average less transparent 
and accountable vis-à-vis the parliament in the implementation and organizational structure dimensions, 
they have to fulfill higher reporting standards. Differences in organizational structure are to be expected, 
as outsourcing the SDM to an agency outside the MoF is a different mode of governance which 
demands less accountability than incorporating the department within the MoF. On the 
implementation dimension there are substantial differences observable as parliaments’ control over 
SDMOs daily activities is considerably lower than for DMOs. A possible explanation could be that 
countries with SDMOs are more willing to take market risks in order to lower their debt servicing 
cost and thereby grant their specialized agencies more room to maneuver in financial markets 
without bureaucratic constraints. On the other hand, SDMOs have on average more reporting 
obligations. This could indicate that reporting is perceived as a counterweight against a lack of 
control by the organizational structures and in the daily operations. It is also noteworthy that 
stricter reporting requirements also serve the interests of government bond investors. 
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Central Bank Independence 
In many of the countries analyzed SDM had been carried out by the central bank. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the previous institutional setting of the respective central bank could 
have influenced the follow-up organization. We tested this relationship with different indices for 
central bank independence (Grilli et al. 1991, Cukierman et al. 1992, Fry et al. 2000) which are all 
slightly (-0.33, -0.52, -0.27) negatively correlated with parliaments’ control over SDM. Our results 
indicate that in countries with high 1980s levels of central bank independence (and, hence, lower 
democratic accountability vis-à-vis elected politicians) (central bank indicators by Grilli et al. 1991, 
Cukierman et al. 1992), nowadays public debt management by DMOs exhibits a low level of 
parliamentary control as well. This suggests a sort of path dependency in the level of democratic 
control over debt management despite the transformation towards financialized debt management 
in recent decades. However, it is important to note that the ongoing low level of parliamentary 
control over SDM after this shift towards greater reliance on financial markets in state finance 
should give us reason for great concern: As already mentioned, until the 1980s interest rates on 
state bonds were “determined by the state and not subjected to the law of supply and demand” 
(Lemoine 2016: 6), non-marketable debt instruments dominated and debt monetisation (inflation) 
was used for deficit financing; but nowadays marketable debt predominates, financing techniques 
of the state are market-determined and public debt is to a much lesser extent “collected and and 
managed through administrative and political regulations” (Lemoine 2016: 3). 
 
Financialization of SDM and of the economy 
These concerns have also motivated us to take the aspect of financialization of SDM and the 
economy into account. For measuring the financialization in SDM, we use two indices. The first 
index, created by Fastenrath et al. (2017), measures the timing of the adoption of financialized 
SDM activities, the second indicator is the share of marketable debt (MD) to total central 
government debt which measures the degree of financialization of SDM. 
Table 4 reveals that being an early adopter of SDM financialization is negatively correlated with 
parliamentary control on the reporting dimension (-0.39). One could argue that early adopters did 
not perceive the respective market risks as dangerous and therefore renounced a higher degree of 
control by reporting which ensures transparency and accountability, while late adopters adjusted 
their respective settings. On the other hand, a positive correlation of early adopting and transparent 
and accountable implementation (0.31) does not support this interpretation. Overall our index is 
nearly independent (0.04) from the point of adoption. In order to analyze this aspect, data over 
time would be necessary. 
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Table 4: Correlations between dimensions and the financialization of SDM (adoption and MD) 
 Timing of the adoption 
MD share to total central 
government debt 
Index 0.04 -0.22 
Legal Framework -0.01 -0.46 
Organizational Structure 0.23 -0.32 
Implementation 0.31 -0.02 
Reporting -0.39 0.24 
Sources: Own calculation. Data on adoption steams from Fastenrath et al (2017: XV (supplementary file)). Marketable 
debt based on OECD Central Government Debt Database for the year 2010. 
 
Another way of assessing the financialization of SDM is directly connected to the states’ openness 
towards financial markets’ practices. The most obvious ratio to look at is the share of marketable 
debt to total central government debt which can serve as a proxy for the degree of financialization 
of SDM (Fastenrath et al. 2017: 279). On the one hand, it could be expected that countries with a 
high share of marketable debt are sensitive to market risks and consequently ensure a strong 
parliamentary control over SDM to cope with this. On the other hand, we may also hypothesize 
that countries with a more financialized SDM may also exhibit lower levels of parliamentary control 
over SDM as market logic dominates and private finance has already significantly penetrated public 
finance. Alternatively debt managers seize on the lack of control to widen their financial market 
activities not only with respect to the use of different financial instruments but also in quantitative 
matters by increasing the share of marketable debt in relation to their total debt portfolio. Indeed, 
we find that parliaments’ control over SDM is slightly negatively correlated with the share of 
marketable debt on central government debt (-0.22). 
While the weakness of the correlation does not allow for definite conclusions on the matter, our 
results at least appear to lend support to the latter interpretation. This impression is reinforced by 
the fact that of those countries included in our analysis, nearly all use derivatives to optimize their 
debt portfolios. However, only in four countries specific and comprehensive reports about the use 
of derivatives, as recommended for example by the OECD (2014), are available. As Fastenrath et 
al. (2017) show, SDM is highly financialized by increasing reliance on financial markets and the 
adoption of financial market techniques, especially by the intense use of derivatives. Our data show 
that this development is confronted by only a low degree of parliamentary capacity to control SDM: 
Our legal framework dimension, as well as the DMOs’ organizational structure, also indicates that 
the more states are financialized the less their parliaments are able to control DMOs’ daily business 
and their organizational structure. 
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Table 5: Correlations between dimensions and the financialization of the economy 
 FIRE (1995) FIRE (2013) 
Index 0.35 0.41 
Legal Framework -0.44 -0.12 
Organizational Structure 0.46 0.57 
Implementation 0.23 0.22 
Reporting 0.15 -0.03 
Sources: Data on FIRE sector to GDP ratio stems from OECD (2017) Value added by activity database, based on the 
year 1995 due to data availability for all countries. Please note that the correlation for 1995 is based on data for 15 
countries. 
 
Besides the direct relationship between the state and financial markets the importance of the 
finance, insurance and real estate sectors (FIRE) for the whole economy, hence, the financialization 
of the economy (for this indicator see Krippner 2005), could influence the respective settings. Table 
5 shows that countries with a higher share of value added by the FIRE sector in 1995 tended to 
have less parliamentary control over SDM by setting a transparent and accountable legal framework 
(-0.44), however with financialization data of 2013 this negative correlation almost vanishes (-0.12). 
Does this indicate that in early financialized economies parliamentary control over SDM is weaker? 
Of interest also is the positive correlation with the implementation as well as the organizational structure 
dimension with only small differences for 1995 and 2013 (0.23 (0.22) and 0.46 (0.57)). In sum our 
index is positively correlated with the share of the FIRE sector on GDP in 1995 (0.35) and 2013 
(0.41). A possible explanation could be that countries which rely heavily on their finance and 
insurance sector seek to attract investors in government bonds who prefer a transparent 
environment. If this interpretation is correct, in a financialized political economy accountability of 
SDM may benefit both taxpayers and investors. 
Overall, our findings indicate that the financialization of SDM and of the economy challenges the 
quality and quantity of democratic control of government debt policies. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this article, we elaborated a four-dimensional index to measure parliamentary control over SDM 
and applied it to 17 OECD countries for which we compiled an original data set. Overall, the level 
of parliamentary control is relatively low with only slight variation across countries. In our subset 
of countries we identify different ways of parliamentary oversight of SDM and trade-offs between 
our four dimensions, not only overall but also across types of democracies, levels of parliamentary 
budgetary power and fiscal transparency as well as types of DMOs. Westminster democracies reach 
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the highest level of parliamentary control, mainly by ensuring a transparent and accountable 
reporting of SDM to their parliaments. We also find that the legal framework of parliamentary 
control over SDM correlates strongly positively with parliamentary budgetary authority, which 
indicates a connection between parliamentary budgetary power and the legal aspects of 
parliamentary SDM control. Furthermore, we identify several relationships between our index, 
respectively our dimensions, and the quality of fiscal and budget transparency. For example, 
countries with weaker fiscal and budget transparency have a more transparent reporting system on 
debt management while DMOs’ daily business is only weakly controlled. Thus, non-transparent 
budgetary policy diffuses to the implementation of SDM but not to the reporting requirements. 
Investigating the DMOs themselves we find that a higher degree of DMO autonomy (which is in 
countries where debt management activities are bundled in SMDOs) is associated with less 
parliamentary control over SDM. This contradicts several SDM recommendations which highlight 
the importance of control with respect to autonomous DMOs (e.g. Piga 2001; Currie et al. 2003).  
Of interest for further studies on financialization is the fact that our analysis also shows 
parliamentary control over SDM is negatively associated with the 1980s’ central bank 
independence. In many of the countries we analyzed, SDM was previously carried out by the 
respective central bank which could have indicated some kind of path dependence. We also find 
that early adopters of SDM financialization prescribe more lenient reporting requirements on SDM 
than late adopters. Furthermore, the higher the share of marketable debt to central government 
debt (thus the higher the degree of financialization in SDM), the weaker the overall parliamentary 
control over the management of public debt and, in particular, the less transparent and accountable 
is the legal framework of control over SDM and the DMOs’ organizational structure. It is 
interesting to note that in the early financialized economies parliaments have less legal control over 
debt management and DMOs’ room to maneuver is less controlled by parliaments. However, the 
financialization of the economy is positively related to the overall parliamentary control of SDM 
as well as the control over DMOs’ daily business (implementation) and their organizational structure. 
Thus, all in all, governments seek to attract bond investors by providing a transparent and 
accountable context for their debt management activities. 
How do these results contribute to the literature of budget policy, delegation and financialization? 
First, our findings indicate that future studies should further investigate the low level of political 
control over debt management as well as the co-variation between the ways different countries 
achieve this control and types of democracy, parliaments’ budgetary power and fiscal transparency. 
Related to these issues, more theoretical work is required to fix the appropriate level of 
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parliamentary SDM scrutiny, and more empirical studies should be dedicated to analyzing the 
reasons for the cross-national variations we exposed. 
Secondly, our study confirms that in the analysis of parliamentary control over public finance it is 
important to differentiate between fiscal, budgetary and debt policies, and with regard to debt 
policy, between the level and type of debt. It does not seem to be reasonable to argue that as long 
as parliaments control the budget and public expenditures, there is no necessity to control the debt 
management as well. It is not only that SDM is different from budgetary and fiscal policies; rather 
in the wake of the financialization of SDM professional debt managers use complex new financial 
instruments such as derivatives which bear the risk of financially very harmful losses; taxpayers 
have already paid the bill for the use of this financial instrument not only in Australia and Belgium 
but in numerous Italian, German, Austrian and US American local municipalities as well 
(Fastenrath et al. 2017). That indebted states adopt these techniques of hedging (but as well 
speculating with) financial markets risks makes public budgets to a negation of taxpayers’ will. 
Thirdly, our results of a generally low level of parliamentary SDM control indicates that even 
though delegation theory points to the need for control when delegating to specialized executive 
bodies (Blom-Hansen 2013; Christensen and Laegreid 2007), this does not yet seem to be the case 
for SDM. Our analyses confirm the findings of delegation literature on trade-off effects between 
expertise and control 
A fourth implication of this study is that future studies should scrutinize whether and how the 
different processes of financialization in advanced capitalist democracies are interconnected and 
what this means for the democratic control over the debt state: Is the financialization of the state 
and its debt management a consequence of the financialization of the companies and private 
households? On the other hand, the positive correlation between the financialization of the 
economy and the parliamentary control over SDM also signals to us that the transparency and 
accountability of SDM vis-à-vis parliaments benefits both the investors in government bonds and 
taxpayers as well. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Table A: Codebook 
No Item  Description Item Source Code  
  Framework       
1 
Debt Limit  Is there a legal debt limit? 
IMF/WB 2003: 53; 
INTOSAI 2007: 
Table 1.a 
0: No 
  0.5: yes but violable 
  1: Yes 
2 
Annual borrowing authorization  
(by act) 
Do legislative acts fix an annual 
borrowing limit? 
IMF/WB 2003: 53 
0: No; 
  1: Yes 
3 
Clause regarding purpose of 
borrowing (by act) 
Are there legal clauses regarding 
the purpose of borrowing? Does 
the act fix the purpose for which 
money is borrowed? 
IMF/WB 2003: 53 
0: No 
  1: Yes 
4 
Legislation or governmental 
ordinance to delegate DM 
Is the DMO established by a 
parliamentary act or by a decree of 
MoF? 
IMF/WB 2003: 18 
0: ministerial 
decree/order 
  0.5: order and act 
  1: act 
5 
Legal restrictions on derivative 
transactions  
Are there any restrictions about 
the amount, quality, and 
conditions on derivative 
transactions which DMOs 
undertake? 
Piga 2001: 79 
0: no 
  1: yes 
6 
Contingent liabilities  
Who decides about contingent 
liabilities? 
IMF/WB 2003: 226 
0:DMO 
  0.5: MoF/Treasury 
  1: Parliament 
7 
Use of credit exposure limits & 
collateral agreements  
Use of credit exposure limits & 
collateral agreements to reduce 
counter party risk by DMO? 
IMF/WB 2003: 86 
IMF 2014: 41 
0: no 
  1: yes 
8 
Accruals accounting 
Is accrual accounting introduced 
at central government level? 
Schick 2002: 30  
0: no 
  1: yes 
9 
Parliamentary budget offices 
There is an office (not a 
parliamentary committee!) which 
provides detailed information, 
staff with financial market 
expertise to improve MPs 
expertise on debt management. 
Schick 2002: 31 
0: no 
  1: yes 
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No Item  Description Item Source Code  
10 
Parliamentary Select 
Committee, Public Account 
Committees 
Does the Parliamentary 
Committee “undertake a 
detailed examination” of the 
debt management? 
INTOSAI, WPG 
“Working Group 
of Public Debt” 
0: no 
1: yes 
11 
Debt Management 
Auditing 
Does the General 
Auditor/Audit Office report to 
parliament about debt 
management? 
WB 2015: 25 
Schick 2002: 30 
IMF 2014: 49 
0: no 
1: yes 
  Organizational Structure       
12 
DMO location 
Is the DMO part of or 
separated from the MoF? 
Currie et al. 2003 
0: separated 
  1: MoF/DoF/Treasury/Gov 
13 
CEO appointment 
Who appoints the DMO’s 
CEO? 
Gilardi 2002: 881 
Cukierman et al. 
1992: 358 
Grilli et al. 1991: 
368 
0: MoF/DoF/Treasury/Gov 
  0.5: MoF and Parliament 
  1: Parliament 
14 
DMO responsibility 
To whom is the DMO 
responsible? 
IMF/WB 2003: 
218 
0: MoF/DoF/Treasury/Gov 
  0.5: MoF and Parliament 
  1: Parliament 
15 
Debt management strategy 
approval 
Who approves the debt 
management strategy? 
IMF/WB 2003 
Melecky 2012 
0: no approval 
  0.5: MoF/Treasury 
  1: Parliament 
16 
External Board 
Is there an external board 
attached to the DMO? 
Gilardi 2002: 881 
Cukierman et al. 
1992: 358 
Grilli et al. 1991: 
368 
0: no 
  
0.5: mixed (with internal 
members of DMO, MoF, for 
instance) 
  1: yes 
17 
Role of External DMO 
Board  
Which functions does the 
external board fulfill? 
Wheeler 2004: 57 
0: only consultative; no 
external board. 
  
0.5: Supervision and/or 
assessment of performance 
  
1: Decision making power 
(makes strategic decisions, 
e.g. SWE) 
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No Item  Description Item Source Code  
18 
External Board Appointment 
Who appoints the external 
board members? 
Wheeler 2004: 64 
IMF 2014: 66 
0: MoF, DoF, Treasury, Gov; 
no external board. 
  1: Parliament 
19 
Code of Conduct  
Is there a PDM specific 
code of conduct for DMO 
employees? 
WB 2015: 58 
INTOSAI 2007: 
Table 1a 
IMF 2014: 9 
0: no 
  1: yes 
  Implementation       
20 
Operational approval of 
borrowing 
Who approves security or 
loan issuing in the daily 
business? 
IMF 2014: 32 
0: no approval 
  
0.5: 
MoF/DoF/Treasury/Gov 
  1: parliament 
21 
Operational decisions on 
derivatives 
Who decides about the use 
of derivatives in the daily 
business? 
Piga 2001 
IMF/WB 2003: 84 
0: DMO 
  
0.5: 
MoF/DoF/Treasury/Gov 
  
1: Parliamentary approval 
required 
22 
Operational decisions on 
buybacks 
Who decides on buybacks 
in the daily business? 
IMF/WB 2003: 84 
0: DMO 
  
0.5: 
MoF/DoF/Treasury/Gov 
  
1: Parliamentary approval 
required 
23 
Tactical trading 
Does the DMO admit 
using beat-the-market 
strategies or is it well 
known for entering 
speculative positions? 
IMF 2014: 35 
IMF/WB 2003: 
161 
Piga 2001 
0:yes 
  1: no 
   1: yes 
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No Item  Description Item Source Code  
  Reporting       
24 
Report on derivatives 
Is any derivative related 
information on (1) 
counterparts, (2) gains 
and losses, (3) maturities, 
(4) risks and ratings 
published in the DMO 
reports? 
IMF 2014: 14 
OECD 2002: 12 
WB 2015: 44 
0: Not specific (0 or 1 sub-
item covered); 
  
0,5: Partially specific (2 or 
3 sub-items covered); 
  
1: fully specific (4 sub-
items covered). 
25 Report on Debt Management 
Strategy  
Is the debt management 
strategy reported? 
WB 2015: 17 
IMF 2014: 18-19 
0: no  
 1: yes 
26 
Classified Report on Debt 
Management Strategy  
Is the report classified? 
(1) by currency 
denomination of the 
debt, (2)  maturity profile, 
(3) fixed vs. variable 
interest rates, (4) whether 
debt is callable, (5) 
strategic benchmarks, (6) 
risk management and/or 
strategies 
WB 2015: 17 
OECD 2002: 12 
IMF 2014: 18-19 
0: Not specific (0 or 1 sub-
item covered); 
  
0,5: Partially specific (2 to 4 
sub-items covered); 
  
1: fully specific (5 or 6 sub-
items covered). 
27 
Reporting towards Parliament 
Who reports to 
parliament about DMO 
activities? 
Gilardi 2002: 882 
IMF 2014: 19 
0:  
MoF/DoF/Treasury/Gov 
  1: Chief executive DMO 
28 
Report on medium term strategy 
Is the parliament 
informed about the 
DMO’s medium-term 
strategy? 
IMF/WB 2003: 168 
Interview with 
former IMF senior 
researcher 
0: no (not existent, not 
available) 
  
0.5: Information available 
and accessible for 
parliament 
  1: approval by parliament 
29 
Report on financial risks 
Does the budget 
documentation report 
risks associated with 
entitlements? 
IMF 2014: 18-20 
Interview with 
former IMF senior 
researcher 
OECD 2014: 109 
0: no (not existent, not 
available) 
  
0.5: Information available 
and accessible for 
parliament 
  1: approval by parliament 
 
  
100  Parliamentary Control over SDM 
 
Table B Overview Country Ranking 
  Analysis Framework 
Org. 
Structure Implemen. Reporting PCI Location Democracy 
1 France 0.59 (7) 0.50 (1) 0.25 (6) 0.50 (3) 0.46 MDMO Semipresidential 
2 Australia 0.45 (14) 0.50 (1) 0.25 (6) 0.58 (1) 0.45 MDMO Westminister 
3 Belgium 0.64 (6) 0.31 (9) 0.38 (2) 0.42 (7) 0.44 MDMO Parl. Monarchy 
4 Canada 0.45 (14) 0.38 (6) 0.38 (2) 0.50 (3) 0.43 MDMO Westminister 
5 Japan 0.68 (2) 0.50 (1) 0.25 (6) 0.25 (12) 0.42 MDMO Parl. Monarchy 
6 USA 0.78 (1) 0.50 (1) 0.33 (4) 0.00 (17) 0.40 MDMO Presidential 
7 New Zealand 0.50 (11) 0.50 (1) 0.50 (1) 0.08 (16) 0.40 MDMO Westminister 
8 United Kingdom 0.45 (14) 0.38 (6) 0.25 (6) 0.42 (7) 0.37 MDMO Westminister 
9 Italy 0.68 (2) 0.31 (9) 0.00 (14) 0.50 (3) 0.37 MDMO Parl. Republic 
10 Sweden 0.68 (2) 0.38 (6) 0.00 (14) 0.42 (7) 0.37 SDMO Parl. Monarchy 
11 Ireland 0.50 (11) 0.13 (17) 0.25 (6) 0.58 (1) 0.36 SDMO Semipresidential 
12 Netherlands 0.55 (9) 0.19 (12) 0.25 (6) 0.42 (7) 0.35 MDMO Parl. Monarchy 
13 Portugal 0.68 (2) 0.19 (12) 0.00 (14) 0.50 (3) 0.34 SDMO Semipresidential 
14 Spain 0.59 (7) 0.31 (9) 0.25 (6) 0.17 (15) 0.33 MDMO Parl. Monarchy 
15 Finland 0.50 (11) 0.19 (12) 0.33 (4) 0.25 (12) 0.32 MDMO Semipresidential 
16 Germany 0.55 (9) 0.19 (12) 0.13 (13) 0.25 (12) 0.28 SDMO Parl. Republic 
17 Denmark 0.45 (14) 0.19 (12) 0.00 (14) 0.42 (7) 0.26 SDMO Parl. Monarchy 
 
mean 
(s.d.) 
0.57 
(0.10) 
0.33 
(0.13) 
0.22 
(0.15) 
0.38 
(0.17) 
0.37 
(0.05) 
  
 
